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## PREFACE

WHEN Cleon's pronouncement was taken by the Council of the Royal Colonial Institute as the theme for its research monograph for the year 1915 the world was at peace. The competition closed in April, 1915, and the war had then lasted for eight months. The present struggle has so profoundly modified our outlook that much of what seemed to be the character of our democracy has vanished. Many of us are conscious that life is sterner and harder than we had ever dreamed it to be. Our sons and brothers have passed through the burning fiery furnace of modern trench warfare and none who have experienced the mingled horror and exaltation of that quintessence of inferno will ever be the same again. The people of our Empire have shown themselves of the true fibre, whether they are of our blood or not. None is so base as not to do reverence to the spirit of that liberty for which we are fighting, and it matters not whether we are labour-leaders, the scions of old British nobility, or derived from a long line of 'solar' ancestry, we are all determined that the struggle must end only in one way, even at the cost of our 'last man and our last shilling'.

It thus follows that some things I have urged in this little essay would in June, 1914, have seemed revolutionary in the extreme to at least half of our people. Now they are the commonplaces of newspaper discussion, and are even being brought into effect—slowly and timidly by our central administration, firmly and energetically by the more virile leaders of our Dominions. For instance, on page 65 I suggest that the Indian tariff should penalise exports of raw material to Germany. In the Press of June 9, 1916, was the announcement that this was being done, not for India's products but for palm kernels from West Africa. On the same page I point out the injustice of allowing Lancashire's trade interests to interfere with India's industrial progress. We have now the welcome spectacle of the present Cabinet, reinforced by Mr. Asquith, presenting a sturdy wall of opposition to Lancashire's selfish demands. If the precedents thus established are followed in other cases, we shall have advanced far on the road to economic safety.

Indeed the events of the last two years have shown that it is not so much a democracy as an oligarchy which is incapable of understanding Imperial problems and of applying the proper solution. The democracy is sound and is slowly but surely eliminating from its mind the insidious poison instilled during years of demagogic tutelage. The nation is ahead of its rulers in its insight into the situation. This is of the happiest omen for the future. If our democracy can destroy the soulless political machines of all parties and choose its future leaders with true judgment it will show that it is capable of handling, or of inspiring those leaders to handle, the complicated problems involved in the management of our Empire. Meanwhile we are becoming more and more aware that the entrenchments of cabinet authority and political chicane which stand opposed to the will of the people are only to be taken by heavy artillery. That artillery it is our duty to supply. There could be no greater victory for genuine freedom than a demonstration of Democracy's ability, when freed from the shackles of political convention, to rule justly and wisely one quarter of the human race—including itself.

Such themes as that with which I have attempted to deal do not permit of originality either of matter or handling. Nevertheless I would hope that I have given some slight assistance to a proper understanding of this wonderful Empire of ours and of the tremendous nature of the responsibility which it imposes upon us of these little islands who are in the last resort charged with the duty of ensuring its well-being and continuance.

I owe more than I can repay to Colonel D. G. Pitcher and Sir Alfred Kensington, late Chief Judge of the Punjab, for their very kind assistance with the proofs. The intimate acquaintance with India which is the outcome of their long and honourable service means that their approval offers at any rate some guarantee that I have not erred very seriously from the proper path.

The call for a second edition has enabled me to make some small corrections and additions and to bring some of the appendices more up to date.

A. E. DUCHESNE.

*May Day, 1917.*

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# DEMOCRACY AND EMPIRE

*A Democracy cannot manage an Empire.'*

## CHAPTER I

### CLEON'S DICTUM AND THE ANCIENT EMPIRES

Πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐτέρων ἀρχειν, μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ νῦν ὑμετέρα περὶ Μυτιληναίων μεταμελεία.

(On many other occasions before this I have been convinced that a democracy is incapable of ruling others, and I am now more than ever so convinced from your present vacillatory policy towards the Mitylenaeans.)

IN these words Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, is inveighing against what he considers the ill-judged proposals of clemency towards the revolting Mitylenaeans. Mitylene was the chief of the five towns of Lesbos, one of the two Aegean islands which in 429 B.C. still remained free from tribute to Athens. Governed by an oligarchy it had long determined to free itself from the pressure of Athenian supremacy. Inviting the aid of Sparta the Lesbians organised revolt. The Athenians acted vigorously, and throughout the winter of 428-7 B.C. blockaded Mitylene. Owing to a mutiny of the Mitylenaeen proletariat against the oligarchy, the city was compelled to surrender to Paches, the Athenian general. Paches eventually sailed back to Athens taking with him the oligarchs who had organised the revolt.

The doom to be inflicted on the Lesbians was the subject of hot discussion in the Athenian Ecclesia. Cleon, the notorious demagogue, procured a decree that all the prisoners at Athens and also every adult male in Mitylene should be put to death, whilst their wives and families should be sold as slaves. The next morning there was a revulsion of feeling and the Ecclesia was again summoned to



reconsider this decree. It was then that Cleon made the speech recorded by Thucydides.

It is noteworthy that this bitter attack on democratic capabilities is made by one who has passed into history—mainly owing to the literary skill of his enemies Thucydides and Aristophanes—as the typical demagogue, the embodiment of the most conspicuous defects of the democratic leader. At least, therefore, it is not open to the suspicion of being inspired by party prejudice.

Before passing to the question of the applicability of Cleon's dictum to the present conditions and future problems of the British Empire, it will, perhaps, be desirable to consider what Cleon meant by an empire and a democracy respectively. What was his democracy and who and in what condition were those others whom a democracy cannot rule?

We may distinguish three modes of government as known to the Greeks of Thucydides' time. These were in by no means exclusive categories, as elements of one form are to be found in another; but speaking broadly they were: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Our more recent knowledge of Athenian arrangements is mainly derived from a treatise on the *Constitution of Athens*, on which such writers as Plutarch (A.D. 100) drew largely, and which they ascribed to Aristotle, though it is doubtful whether the philosopher really wrote it.

The Athenian democracy was, as are most democratic constitutions, a gradual development from an earlier form of government of a monarchical type. It is convenient here to distinguish a *tyranny* as a form in which the power is vested in one man, generally not by hereditary succession. (After Codrus it is doubtful if the hereditary principle was recognised in Athens.) The word *tyrant* has not here its modern significance, and carries no shade of reference to the character of the rule, whether good, bad, or indifferent, but only to its mode of acquirement and its unfettered exercise. It thus corresponds more closely to *autocrat* than to any other term. 'The tyrant of the Chersonese was *Freedom's* best and bravest friend: *that* tyrant was Miltiades.'

When the State got rid of its old patriarchal kings the power passed into the hands of an oligarchy, in Athens composed of the *Eupatridae* (cf. the Indian—*Twice-born*). The oligarchy had neither the prescriptive sanction of antiquity nor the irresistible force of just and upright rule, and degenerated into a corrupt and oppressive system,

## CLEON'S DICTUM AND THE ANCIENT EMPIRES 3

which tended neither to the aggrandisement of the State nor the well-being of the people.

The reforms of Solon had admitted the people below the rank of Eupatridae to the power of control, without the authority to interfere in matters of detail. They were to choose such of the Eupatridae as they deemed worthy, to administer the affairs of State, while through the medium of the Ecclesia an indirect but effective control was exercised in a general way. At this period we are confronted with what is probably the closest analogy to the modern democracy. There are, however, striking divergencies, due to the difference of ethical standard, which will be referred to in their proper place.

After the tyranny of the Pisistratids, culminating in the tragedy of Hipparchus and the expulsion of Hippias, Attica settled down to that democratic or republican form which, modified by Aristides, Pericles, and others, is identified for most of us with the name of Athens. After the death of Pericles the democratic element gained more and more power. Jurymen were paid. The poorer citizens received a money grant to enable them to keep holiday, and about 400 B.C. all who attended the Ecclesia received payment (cf. modern payment of members of Parliament).

The population of the Athenian state consisted of slaves, resident aliens, and citizens. Slaves were at all times very numerous. They had few rights and were not eligible for military service. The resident aliens were mostly engaged in trade. Each adult alien paid a yearly tax, and was under the obligation of naval or military service. The privileges of the citizens, who alone were entitled to vote, bore many points of resemblance to those of the *Freemen* of the City of London at the present day. They had two principal legislative chambers: the Ecclesia and the Boulé. For the former all adult citizens were eligible, so that five or six thousand might be present at a meeting. The Ecclesia was the ultimate source of all law and authority. The Boulé was a council of five hundred appointed by lot. Its functions appear to have been subordinate and generally preliminary to those of the Ecclesia.

It may be safely assumed that there were in Attica at the time of Thucydides some 400,000 slaves, 45,000 resident aliens, and perhaps 100,000 citizens. Such was the constitution and such the tiny population of that democracy to which Cleon was addressing himself. The total cannot have been more than the combined populations of the present Metropolitan boroughs of Wandsworth and Lambeth.

The *others* referred to by Cleon are some of the two hundred and forty-nine cities whose names have come down to us on the old Athenian tribute lists. Their total population may have equalled that of Sheffield at the present day. At fixed times tax-collecting galleys sailed round and gathered the contributions from each city. Athens had also Cleruchies or military Colonies in the Chersonese and other places, as well as actual Colonies analogous to our modern settlements. These were all under the absolute domination of Athens, and the situation is well summed up in the spirited address of the Lesbian envoys to the Lacedaemonians :

ἑὺμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰσου ἡγούντο, προθύμως εἰπόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων δουλώσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἡμεν. . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν. καὶ πιστοὺς οὐκέτι εἶχομεν ἡγεμόνας Ἀθηναίους, παραδείγμασι τοῖς προγιγνομένοις χρώμενοι· οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς οὕς μὲν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἐνσπόνδους ἐποιήσαντο καταστρέψασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὑπολοίπους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα ἐδυνήθησαν, μὴ δρᾶσαι τοῦτο.

(We allied ourselves to the Greeks for their liberation from the Medes, and not in any sense to the Athenians in order to enslave other Greeks. As long as they led us as comrades and not as subjects we followed them with alacrity ; but when they, relaxing in their hostility to the Medes, began to set about enslaving the allies, we were seized with alarm . . . we joined their enterprises as free and independent men—at any rate in name. And now we have no confidence in the leadership of the Athenians, after what we have seen, for if they reduce to subjection the rest of those to whom they are bound by treaty, will they not do the same to us if ever they have the power?)

Thus to sum up: Cleon's democracy involved slave-holding and a privileged class of citizens. His *empire* was a loose conglomeration of allied dominated states, sullenly acquiescent in, or treacherously revolting against, the selfish supremacy of Athens. The contrast between this state of things and that in the British Empire of to-day will be demonstrated in a subsequent section.

When we consider the ancient Empires of the world, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, we perceive everywhere the same state of things. Empire is essentially *imperium*—power; the lust of dominion is the

of Switzerland, do we derive the impression of a very perfect democracy. There are defects in the economic arrangements of each which militate against the enjoyment of equal rights by all sections of the populace. France has deprived her citizens of an organised Church. Her Church has in return intrigued. Thus there have been obstacles in the way of the expression of the religious instinct. The United States are hampered by the heterogeneity of much of their population. This lends itself to economic oppression by the dominant wealthy, and to the resultant sporadic lawlessness of the oppressed.

Such circumstances are not the most favourable for the cultivation of civic virtue, particularly in times of peace. War changes the aspect of affairs. It is especially noticeable that in times of crisis the democratic forms and safeguards disappear. The Northern States employed compulsion to fill their armies, and the same necessity has been recognised now that the United States are at war with the Germanic alliance. It is noteworthy that in every part of the States patriotic adherence to the country's cause became the dominant note immediately war was declared. The States are now really *united* in face of the enemy.

## CHAPTER III

### THE ANSWER OF HISTORY

It is therefore doubtful whether an Empire of the type of the British could ever be run by any of the modern democracies outside our own. If we look back into history can we find any answer to the question: Has democracy in the past been successful in the management of dominions in any way coming within the category of Empire? There are certainly instances where democracy has failed in the government of Empire, but history is reluctant to reveal any conspicuous successes.

A cardinal example is that of the Phœnician dominions, more particularly of Carthage, the stoutest foe encountered by the rising Roman power. It is impossible to be precise as to the constitution of Carthage. Our information is scanty, and mostly derived from sources hostile to the Carthaginians. It is, however, fairly evident that beneath the actual executive authority wielded by the *Suffetes*, and the legislative and administrative functions of the Senate, lay the elective power of the (ancient type) democracy. In the popular elections there seems to have been the usual corruption, and one authority states that the chief offices were freely sold. A kind of *imperium in imperio* existed in the *Pentarchies* who elected the council of a hundred and four, which gradually usurped the authority of the State. From the ancient standpoint, since Carthage was neither a kingdom, a tyranny, nor an oligarchy, it must be classified as a democracy.

The empire of Carthage extended over a large part of the Mediterranean, and her conquests were probably undertaken in order to extend, develop, and secure her commerce; the Phœnicians being essentially traders. Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, Sicily, parts of Liguria and Gaul, Spain, and even the West coast of Africa, all felt the influence of this enterprising race. Yet all this was lost, despite even the genius, patriotism, and energy of Hannibal, owing to the divided councils, sordid dissensions, and self-interested action of the

people of Carthage. Lack of adequate support led to the disaster of Zama in 202 B.C., which put a period to the far-sighted endeavours of Hannibal, and Carthage began that half-century of agony which ended in the total destruction of the city. 'Where the Phoenicians had trafficked for five hundred years Roman slaves pastured the herds of their distant masters.' Carthage was crushed by Rome, because Roman leadership, though subject to popular interference, was infinitely less so than Carthaginian.

Rome followed much the same path as Athens. Beginning with a kingship, she moved through an oligarchy to a democracy. If we enquire into the origin of her world-dominion, we find that the greatest advances were made at periods—sometimes widely separated from one another—when the control of the city's affairs was practically in the hands of one man. The early history of Rome is involved in obscurity, which the legends do little to illuminate. It is, however, fairly certain that the foundation and subsequent early prosperity of Rome coincided with a period of regal power which terminated about 500 B.C. From that time to 27 B.C. when Octavius was proclaimed *Imperator Caesar Augustus*—a period of nearly five centuries—we have the Roman Republic, acclaimed by most as the model constitution of pre-Christian times. Yet the conviction is forced on us that, during this period of growing influence and dominion, that influence spreads and that dominion is enlarged rather in spite of, than because of, the republican constitution. The early institution of the *Dictator* is a tribute to the necessity in foreign relations of the one strong authority, a confession of the democratic incapacity for all save domestic affairs. At the height of the democracy, during the second century B.C., while Roman supremacy was asserting itself over every country of the Mediterranean, the burden of affairs became too great for the people, who left it more and more to the Senate. That body, busying itself with Imperial interests, allowed home affairs to fall into confusion. The plebs, oppressed by those who took advantage of the prevailing laxity, began to bestir themselves with great recklessness. One result of this was the virtual dictatorship of Marius. From that moment the doom of the republic was sealed. While nominally subservient to the republican constitution, Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Crassus, Caius Julius, each asserted in turn an individual ascendancy. Subsequently men saw that under the pressure of circumstance the ancient democracy had given way, and were rejoiced to find relief from the jars of civil strife in the thinly veiled despotism of Augustus.

Meanwhile the genius of Caius Julius had added Gaul and Britain—at least nominally—to the Roman dominions. Under the early Emperors these dominions were widely extended and wisely governed. The symptoms of decay were seen when the proletariat were pampered, when the people clamoured for privileges instead of performing duties, when the cry *panem et circenses* was substituted for *pro aris et focis*.

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,  
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay.

Holland affords a very conspicuous example of democratic weakness in dealing with and preserving a colonial empire. At one time Holland was mistress of the seas. She disputed with us the possession of the fairest islands of the East. The Dutch East India Company was the successful rival of our own organisation. Yet the jealousies and antagonism of rival parties ruined the chances seemingly so fair, and it is only under a personal rule, as of William the Stadtholder in the middle of the eighteenth century, that we find Holland at all able to assert her fast-vanishing influence. In 1705 the Batavian Republic was declared, only to pass through a series of vicissitudes ending in Napoleon's virtual annexation of the country. Finally a constitutional monarchy was established in 1813, and after the severance of Belgium in 1831, Holland entered on her present period of peaceful prosperity. Gone are all the larger possibilities; her remaining colonial possessions have been secured to her rather by disunion among her foes and the magnanimity of Britain, than by her own strength or the justice of her rule.

The *kingdom* now exists by the tacit guarantee of Europe, a prey for a quarter of a century to the liveliest apprehensions as to German designs. Had the political sagacity of democratic Holland been equal to her valour and adequate to the recognition of her best interests, her leaders would probably have made her one of the Great Powers. *Dis aliter visum*, and Holland affords us little support to the opponent of Cleon's saying.

Among instances of republican grandeur Venice rises at once to the mind. At the zenith of her power she wielded unique influence, and her banners flaunted on an equality with those of the descendants of the Caesars. Yet without going minutely into particulars it will readily be conceded that her history exhibits the weakness of democratic constitutions in all foreign relations. Superbly successful during

the sixteenth century, Venice was the bulwark of Christianity against the onrush of Islam. At that time the first naval power in the world with an arsenal capable of turning out a hundred galleys in as many days, Venice gradually declined till in 1814 she was callously handed over to Austria, whose victim she remained till 1866. Modern Venice, like the rest of the present kingdom of Italy, owes everything to a constitutional monarchy.

History would seem to hold for us the lesson that no democracy can manage an empire founded by aggression. Such an empire simulates the worst features of despotic rule, while it is exposed to the consequences of the defects inherent in the constitution of the central power. The British Empire has not the former disadvantage. It is endeavouring to guide the overseas dominions by sympathy rather than to rule them by force. Is our central organisation suitable to the task, or do we share in those defects which history has revealed to us as common to most democracies?



## CHAPTER IV

### THE BRITISH DEMOCRACY

THE history of the United Kingdom has followed something of the usual course. We have a conqueror inflicting his will upon the people, followed by a feudal system in which the monarch was *primus inter pares*. The Wars of the Roses were fatal to the nobility, and with the Tudors we find the attempt made to rule in accordance with the Lutheran doctrine of the Sovereign's absolute supremacy both in Church and State. Under the feebler Stuarts the attempt failed, and the sturdy Calvinism of the Parliamentarians abolished for ever from our polity the motto—*a deo rex, a rege lex*. We then passed through an oligarchical period during which the Whig aristocracy were the real governors. With the overthrow of the Napoleonic power the democracy begins to assert itself, and through the nineteenth century rises steadily into importance. The freeing by the Tory party of trades-unionism from the penalties and odium of criminality, the passing of the Reform Acts, the steady extension of the franchise, compulsory primary education: these bring us to the end of the century. The present century has seen in its opening years a rapid extension of the democratic machinery in a distinctly Socialistic direction.

The theory of the British Constitution is that the monarch rules, but that his rule is exercised through Ministers of State on whose advice he always acts. These ministers are representative of a Parliamentary majority, and are directly responsible to Parliament for all they do. It follows that an ingenious interpretation is put on the axiom that the king can do no wrong. Since he acts on the advice of his ministers, and those ministers are the chosen of the people, the responsibility is the people's alone, and Parliament must deal with the ministers if the action is to be disavowed. Nothing in theory could be more democratic and in the abstract more calculated to preserve the liberties of the people. Yet in practice it does not quite achieve the theoretical perfection. It involves the Party system,

which in its turn implies 'Party discipline'. The two (or more, recently) parties are engaged in an endless tug-of-war, and must never agree. If the party in power takes up any scheme the opposition must fight it tooth and nail, regardless of the merits of the proposal.

It is evident that this party system involves the cardinal defect of all democracies, a pandering to mere number irrespective of intellectual capacity or real knowledge. The most successful politician is not he who can devise the best measures for the health of the people, the advancement of industry, or the safety of the nation. No, he is the man who can sway the crowd, influence the masses, and gain votes. The party managers must refuse to admit to the party programme any measure which will alienate the voter, and so destroy the sole foundation of party success. Equally must the party orators seek by claptrap to delude the voters, having beforehand carefully selected such proposals as are likely to be popular, regardless of their intrinsic value.

There is now very little personal bribery in English politics, but this vote-hunting involves a species of corruption strictly analogous to the *panem et circenses* of Roman decadence. This consists in the attempt to please or enrich one section or one district at the expense of the rest. To that end promises are lavished at election time.

The danger of all this is that in the first place the politician is very rarely genuine in his vociferous shouting of the party war cries. The very necessity for pandering to the more selfish instincts of masses of men tends to obscure the finer issues and to inculcate by implication the dangerous doctrine that the end justifies the means. In the second place it lulls that unthinking part of the people to whom it is addressed to an oblivion of the fact that duty is the first call on every citizen. The sense of responsibility is narcotised. When poorer school children are fed by the State it is a very short step to the claim that children, as a State asset, should be a State responsibility; and that parental responsibility ceases with the most casual begetting.

When the citizen is taught that the State will protect his life and property against foreign aggression, and that *his* life and *his* property are most precious, he ceases to hold the manly privilege of self-defence as any concern of his, and resents as impertinence any attempt to persuade him that it is his duty so to train himself that he may be fit to exercise that manly privilege. The proletarian is encouraged neither to pay for the feeding and education of his children, nor to

train himself to bear arms. By this he is so much the weaker man and the worse citizen.

The ideal democracy should allow of the unfettered action, within reasonable and legal limits, of each of its members. There has, however, grown into existence an extension of trade-union authority which tends to limit very seriously the freedom of the trade-unionist. This aims at imposing upon the worker a maximum amount of work (more than which he must not perform) coupled with a minimum wage (less than which the employer must not pay), degrading the efficient to the level of the non-efficient. Further, the trades-unions seek to dictate to their members the exact tinge of their political creed. The pandering of each party in turn to the Labour vote leads to the adoption of similar tactics by the ministry of the moment, with the result that administrative power constantly seeks to substitute itself for statutory authority and to legislate itself out of the common-law subordination of the executive to the judicial.

Our constitutional arrangements have therefore certain defects inherent in the very system which has grown up. The most conspicuous is that division into parties to which reference is made above. Another is the gradual passing of power into the hands of lawyers. In our ideal democracy the fountains of justice would flow freely, their waters would be crystal clear, and they would be as accessible to the poorest and meanest as to the richest and most influential. This is distinctly not the case in the United Kingdom at the present day. The multiplication of statutes, each drawn up in that antiquated jargon which is everywhere the peculiar pride of the lawyer caste, has necessitated that for the settling of the simplest differences recourse must be had to the expensive aid of the legal specialist.

Gradually the lawyer creeps in everywhere. He ousts the merchant, the landowner, the men of other professions than his own, from the parliamentary representation of their co-electors, with the result that the legislative chamber tends more and more to resemble a debating society of forensic neophytes rather than an assembly of sober-minded citizens intent on enhancing in the simplest way possible the well-being of their fellow lieges and the prosperity of their Sovereign's dominions.

Another defect of the party system is that it destroys the reality of parliamentary representation. The constituency has no real freedom of choice and can only elect candidates nominated or approved by the central party organisation. Further, when elected, a member

only nominally represents his constituency, as it is impossible for the constituency to gain a hearing unless it suits the purpose of those who pull the party strings. The amount of time allotted for 'private' business is very small, the ballot works with wooden impartiality, and ministers acquire a disingenuous subtlety in the answering of questions, a subtlety to which the legal training distinctly lends itself. The questions are apt to degenerate into mere badgering of political opponents, the answers into mere baffling of attack. Very rarely, indeed, is there real honest endeavour to probe a matter to the bottom in the interest either of the constituency or the nation.

By almost imperceptible degrees the Cabinet has become supreme. In theory, the responsible ministers of the Crown should advise the Sovereign, having taken every precaution to make themselves well-informed as to the desires of the House, and through the House of the nation. Actually the party programme is cut and dried, based possibly on the last election cries, or even on something which has been carefully hidden from the electorate for fear of shocking it into a transfer of votes. That programme is carried through by means of guillotine and kangaroo resolutions, primarily introduced to facilitate business, but usually so applied as to stifle discussion. A mechanical majority, often ignorant of the course of debate where such has been held, is employed to trot hither and thither at division time in obedience to the crack of the party whip. Power therefore fluctuates between two extremes: it is exercised alternatively by the mass of unthinking men led by the sophisticated rhetoric of the hustings, who exercise dominion up to and during the election: and by the party leaders, who once in power may safely proceed as they like till the ominous signs of a coming election once more warn them to dress up a new programme for popular acceptance.

On the one hand the people are swayed by an appeal to their passions—as fear of starvation, hatred of oppression, dislike of restriction, desire of easy aggrandisement. On the other they are betrayed by a cynical abandonment of the pretence to consult them. The dispute as to the referendum is fair evidence of how little sincere is the average politician in his loudly proclaimed trust in, and desire to consult, the people.

History shows conclusively that a democracy *as such* cannot face a crisis. The crisis always brings the leader, who is trusted implicitly or the State falls. The Romans, wiser than we, made constitutional provision for a *dictator* in times of stress. The predominance of

Cromwell put an end to the jarring strife of sects and factions and raised England to a lofty pinnacle among contemporary nations. The wild revolutionary elements of Jacobin France, under pressure of foreign hostility, bowed submissive to the iron will and strategic genius of Napoleon Bonaparte. The Northern States yielded to the yoke of Lincoln and Grant and *compelled* their men to serve in the army in order that, through much bloodshed, a lasting peace might be ensured. We are now passing through such a crisis, and all democratic forms are in abeyance. Necessity rules all, even to the point of imposing conditions on industry and the muzzling of the Press. The War Chiefs have only to ask and they receive, and a nation which flouted advice to prepare found itself on the outbreak of war within measurable distance, not of compulsory training, but of compulsory service.✓

These defects just enumerated are more or less common to all democracies, and are largely due to the inability to take long views which is the cardinal failing of all masses of men. To take two instances: popular opinion in Great Britain has been against proper preparation for national defence. The people were affrighted by the wrongly styled *conscription* bogey from compulsion. They were haunted by an indefinite and imaginary danger called militarism. The forces of piety were enlisted to prove that military training destroyed all the humaner virtues and made men bloodthirsty. The benefits of systematic drill were denied to school children lest they should become imbued with this terrible militarism and the horrid spectacle be witnessed of infants of tender years clamouring to be led to scenes of slaughter. Schools were forbidden to fly the Union Jack lest the exhibition of the national emblem might arouse in the immature breasts of their pupils a rampant and intolerable patriotism. Boy Scouts were only tolerated on condition that their organisation and methods had nothing of the 'military' element. Those who advocated a strong navy were openly accused of being in the pay of armament firms. The warnings of the cleanest and noblest public servant of any age and any country were sneered at as the imbecilities of senile decay. Ministers apologised to foreign countries for his ill-judged (!) remarks, and weekly journals called on some one to muzzle him.

Again, other far-sighted men called attention to the decay of certain of our industries, the danger arising from this desuetude, and the insidious permeation of our most powerful continental rival. Led away by popular phrase-mongering this warning was attributed to the

sinister influence of the American trust, and democracy, disregarding the warning, slept, blissfully complacent in having averted the horrible danger of capitalist combination and ignoring the greater danger looming ahead.

If it is difficult for our democracy to believe the disinterested expert it is even more difficult for it to have confidence in the 'man on the spot'. The case of the Labour leader who, having inveighed against our splendid Indian Civil Service as composed of sun-dried bureaucrats, was rewarded by a place on a Commission to inquire into the constitution and work of that Service, is a typical example of this distrust, which has in the past led to distinct breaches of faith, of which two instances stand out in glaring relief. In April, 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, in pursuance of powers granted to him, annexed the Transvaal. In 1881, Lord Roberts, on arriving in South Africa to retrieve the disaster of Majuba, learned that Gladstone, yielding to sentimental impulse, had arranged the retrocession of the annexed State. From that fatal step came the opportunity for German intrigue and ultimately the tremendous sacrifices of the last South African war.

More recently we have the question of the administrative division of Bengal. In the debate in the House of Lords on February 21, 1912, Lord Curzon set forth the real reason for the division. He said :

'I became acquainted with the scandalous maladministration which was going on in the eastern province of Bengal, and the shocking neglect of education and public works and all that goes to make a contented life of the people, and with the oppression of the Muhammadans by their neighbours. . . . The line was based upon ethnical and geographical considerations, the importance of which will not be denied.'

Certain sections among the Indians seized on the division as a convenient excuse for agitation. A British member of Parliament exhorted them to 'Agitate, agitate, for Morley will yet yield'. Ostensibly Lord Morley did not yield. On the contrary he plainly announced the partition to be a settled fact. Yet all the while he was waiting for a convenient opportunity to undo Lord Curzon's work, a task he finally left to his successor. These are Lord Morley's own words in that historic debate, speaking in defence of his own share in the rescission of the partition :

'My noble friend and I were engaged upon a project of Council reform. That was a project which was regarded by a great many people as dangerous,

as hazardous in the extreme, as opening the door to all kinds of mischief. It was a reform for the successful carrying out of which we were bound to have with us, as far as ever we could, the good opinion and the friendly aid of the Indian Civil Service and of Anglo-Indian public opinion. If they had seen that we were going to reverse Lord Curzon's policy, that we were then going to launch out on this difficult and arduous voyage, we should have run the risk of having our whole course and prospects seriously damaged. Friends of my own were very angry with me for many months for not taking immediate steps for reversing that policy.'

Lord Morley, at the very time he was contemplating the annulment of the partition, deliberately assured the Muhammadans that the partition was a settled fact. He had no shame in this debate in openly avowing his callous breach of faith.

The effect on native opinion in India is well seen in the following pronouncement by a Hindu writer :

'The modification of the partition of Bengal is considered to be a triumph of political agitation. The Government of India was avowedly desirous of not incurring the charge of opportunism or weakness. But Lord Crewe in his reply has ignored that aspect of yielding to sentiment, and pronounced it to be wrong to provoke resentment by ignoring race prejudice and local sentiment. It is likely that statesmanship will hereafter consist as much in bowing to agitation as in balancing opposing considerations.'

The fickleness of democracy was painfully exhibited in connection with the South African war. The news of the relief of Mafeking produced a wild outburst of popular rejoicing unprecedented in our history. Yet after the declaration of peace the heroism of its defenders was forgotten, and thousands of ex-soldiers of good character joined the ranks of the unemployed.

The picture would be unduly gloomy if only the defects and demerits of modern democracy were exposed to view. Democracy has its merits in abounding measure. Against its fickleness, its weakness in crisis, its pandering to the demagogic influence, we may set off other weighty considerations.

It is imbued with a deep sense of what is due to the weak and helpless. It has an earnest desire to raise the fallen, to alleviate the lot of the toiler, to render more healthy the conditions of labour. It places great dependence on education, and desires to see everywhere the '*carrière ouverte aux talents*'. It believes in the completest expression of national consciousness, and is full of sympathy for small peoples struggling to achieve that expression. It is with our race the

genuine outcome of our instinct for freedom, and is therefore worthy of respect. It is in accordance with the modern trend of affairs, and it is hopeless to expect to reverse the present current. We must therefore accept the 'chose jugée', and endeavour in every way to supplement deficiencies and remedy evils.

We may now pass to a moderately detailed consideration of our Empire and a few of the problems which it presents, but before doing so it must be emphasised that the United Kingdom is the centre of the Empire. It is the focus of the Imperial sentiment of all the dominions. It is the kindly motherland of all its children, whether exiled in the fever-stricken swamps of the Terai or making new homes under the genial skies of New Zealand. Its parliament is the 'mother of parliaments', its laws and institutions are the exemplar for all the wider realms. Its king is the beloved sovereign alike for the Canadian, the Maori, and the Hindu. It is therefore of paramount importance that we of these little islands do nothing to make us a stumbling-block and a hindrance to our overseas kinsmen and fellow subjects.



## CHAPTER V

### THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE British Empire differs from all the other empires of history in many ways. In origin it has neither been due to deliberate acquisition by domineering autocrats as were the Assyrian and Persian, nor has it developed from a loose alliance of kindred peoples as did the Athenian. Still less is it the outcome of the proselytising fervour of a whole people, newly admitted to a vivifying religion, as were the kingdoms built up by the Saracens and other sons of Islam. The famous answer of Topsy in *Uncle Tom's Cabin* appears to be the nearest explanation of its origin we can give. The British Empire has been a growth. Pressure of circumstances, Fate, Divine Providence, the Hand of God ; such expressions as these, which are so often in our mouths when referring to the origin of our noble heritage, merely serve to indicate, according to the idiosyncrasy of the speaker, the fact that of conscious human design in its acquisition our Empire shows no slightest trace. Far from its being the case that British Governments have of deliberate and set purpose planned to acquire new territories it is an actual fact that, as in the case of Papua, annexed by Queensland some thirty years ago, Government has often disavowed the action of vigorous pioneers and refused to take over the territory acquired by them.

In 1824 English pioneers obtained from the Zulus a grant of land in what is now Natal. In 1834 they asked to be recognised as a regular Colony, but Government refused, and confusion reigned, till after much bloodshed of Zulus and Boer immigrants, Natal was in 1843 declared a British Colony.

It is sometimes made a reproach to us that desire for trade rather than lust of dominion has everywhere laid the foundation of our Empire. The assertion is true, the reproach unjustified. We owe India to the East India Company, and we owe much of what we have acquired elsewhere to the fact that the trading instinct in us stands apart from the clash of party or the armed conflict of civil strife, so that even in the times of Charles I and Cromwell our Empire

extension went steadily on. Thus, since they were rarely founded in obedience to *doctrinaire* considerations, our overseas possessions were regulated by local circumstance, and so have preserved in each case a large measure of that individuality which constitutes their real strength. This aspect is well summed up by Professor Morgan when he says :

‘ Our Empire, whatever its failings, was never founded upon pedantry or conceived by art. We have very little literature of an Imperialistic character. Literature is self-conscious, and the founders of our Empire were never self-conscious. Neither were they doctrinaires. We have no theory of Empire. We do not talk of “ a place in the sun ”, nor of the “ terror ” of an Imperial name.’

From the spontaneous, or unpurposed, origins of the Empire come many important consequences. It has no more symmetry than any other natural growth. The brief and all too imperfect conspectus of the classical empires given in Chapter I should serve to show how much of conscious design there was in their inception. The same system, of tribute, of service, of allegiance, of jurisprudence, must prevail throughout. The central authority must be paramount in every detail. The British Empire is far more complex than the Roman Empire at its greatest, far less centralised than the Athenian at its loosest. It has no written constitution, the ties which bind together its constituent parts are frail as gossamer, yet, as the world is now realising, stronger than the most perfect links ever forged by pedantic makers of paper constitutions. Here we have acquired a continent holding myriads of men of ancient races, who profess religions hallowed through the ages and follow customs which were of traditional prescription when our nation was centuries from its birth, and the founder of our faith had not yet manifested himself. These peoples preserve their rights, they move unfettered beneath the august sanctions of their venerable creeds: their adherence to their old-world customs presents us with a palimpsest of ages which otherwise are revealed to us only by the discoveries of the archaeologist or in the dusty tomes of the erudite professor.

To another place we have sent the overflow of our own people. Here vast spaces remain to be filled. Scanty populations of humble savages, stationary and unenlightened, are replaced by the eager, progressive democrats of our race. Yet again we find an ancient land of mystery suffering from ill-government, exposed to fanatic attack on its southern border, deprived of all incentive to advancement. To

its assistance we send the best from among us. We preserve its rulers from the decay which is their natural fate. We maintain peace, we repel invasion, we encourage trade and industry. Under our fostering care the people of the land wax fat and prosperous.

Of our various dominions, some twenty-six have come into our hands by treaty cession, sixteen by settlement after pioneer discovery, seven by annexation ; there are several protectorates, and one condominium by occupation and agreement. Possibly twelve only are the result of actual conquest, though it must be remembered that of these India is only partly ours by conquest, a great part having been acquired by treaty. Further, the Native States are held to us by agreements, to the strict fulfilment of which our national honour is pledged.

Thus we have every variety of mode in the acquirement, leading naturally to an equal variety in the terms of holding and the manner of government. We have, composing our Empire, one Constitutional Monarchy, one Empire, five Self-governing Dominions, a number of Crown Colonies falling into three distinct categories. In some instances we may term the territory administered a Protectorate, in others our authority, though real, is vague, and we speak of Spheres of Influence. Egypt ought now to be spoken of as a Protectorate, while the Soudan is best described as a Condominium.

From 1583, when Newfoundland was occupied by Sir Humphrey Gilbert in the name of Queen Elizabeth (this occupation was not confirmed till the treaty of Utrecht in 1713), till 1914, when German Samoa and New Guinea became ours, we have a period of 330 years during which the British Empire has been steadily growing. The only Empire of antiquity with which the British is at all comparable is the Roman. Even if we disregard the time occupied in the consolidation of Roman power in Italy and take the first Punic war as the commencement of Roman world dominion, we have a period of 740 years (264 B.C.—A.D. 476), till Odoacer deposed the youthful Augustulus, during which Rome was successful in maintaining her rule. Compared with Rome the British Empire is still in the prime of early manhood, and, even if it is to last no longer than the Roman, has an 'expectation of life' of another 400 years. It, therefore, behoves us to consider very carefully how we may best ensure the continuance of our Empire, till if an end must come it shall come as a natural consequence of steady development, and not as a result of our own faults or defects.

The British Empire occupies one-fourth of the habitable globe and

contains over one-fourth of the world's estimated population. Of that area the greater part is in temperate regions, and therefore suitable for white occupation. Of the total population of (say) 440,000,000 only 63,000,000 (including 46,000,000 in the British Isles) are of the white races. There are three vast spaces—Temperate North America, Australasia, and South Africa—which have a conjoint area of close upon 8,000,000 square miles, with a white population of only 15,000,000, or less than two persons to a square mile. There are other parts, as Lower Bengal, with an agrarian population of 900 to the square mile, all of non-British race. The most cursory survey therefore reveals at the outset two of the primary problems confronting us—how to fill up those spaces with adequate numbers of our own race; and how to rule those other tracts so as to secure the health, prosperity, and contentment of their crowded indigenous populations.

The dominions over the seas naturally fall into two categories, from whichever point of view we regard them. The first of these comprises the great self-governing dominions: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Newfoundland, and South Africa. Or we may put in our first category those which are mainly in temperate regions and, therefore, completely fit for white occupation, that occupation having been mainly achieved by settlement rather than conquest. We shall find that in this category are few dominions other than those in the former. As I have stated in the preceding paragraph, these dominions are precisely those which have the largest territory available for occupation by generations of our race yet unborn.

Yet with all this land lying open to development it is precisely in these democratic dominions that men have crowded most into the cities. Under a feudal dispensation of the old type the population would be much more scattered, clustering round the various castles of the chiefs. It is one of the weaknesses of democracy that, with the power to choose, the people prefer the crowded and comparatively unhealthy life of the city, with its feverish indoor amusements, to the more lonely, but more healthful, existence in the rural districts. It is with a shock that one realises that in Australia 56 per cent. of the people are in towns, and indeed 38·5 per cent. of the population in the six capital cities. In New Zealand the figures are 51 per cent., and 35 per cent. in the four chief cities. Canada has 44·5 per cent. of her population in towns, a percentage increased with the winter migration of labour from the out-districts. Contrast this with ancient and non-democratic India, which has only 9·5 per cent. of its population

in the towns. These are extremes, and India suffers as much from lack of town industries as the other dominions in the reverse way.

There is thus a surface similarity between these self-governing dominions, so that it will be possible to some extent to consider their problems as identical. Yet under the surface we should find, did we probe, many marks of individuality. Thus Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have no 'native' problem of any magnitude. In each case the aboriginal inhabitants are few in number, and negligible in influence. The Maoris of New Zealand are, it is true, a magnificent race physically and mentally. The Indians of Canada are the descendants of Fenimore Cooper's heroes. The 'black fellows' of Australia have furnished materials for the learned writers on totems and tribal customs. Yet none of these have the political significance of the 4,700,000 men of coloured races in the Union of South Africa, including 140,000 Asiatics in Natal.

Again, Canada from its proximity to the United States has acquired much of the modernity, the *up-to-dateness*, characteristic of that republic, with which a large part of its commerce is carried on. Yet within its borders are the French Canadians, an old world community in which still linger traces of the feudalism in which it was founded. Australasia, isolated in the midst of a vast ocean, is almost aggressively British in its outlook—perhaps a keener, brighter, more daring outlook than that of the old country. Yet Australia, at least, has its own harassing pre-occupation, the haunting dread of invasion by hordes of Asiatics, a fear which is only faintly realised on the Pacific slope of Canada. South Africa has during the war actively, loyally, and successfully combated the tremendous forces of German intrigue and German aggression, whilst Australia and New Zealand have wrested Germany's island empire from our common foe.

Finally, as to constitution there are marked differences. The Dominion of Canada is a confederation of the separate provinces, which are, so to speak, *under* the Dominion Government, and entrust to that government all powers not specifically assigned to the provinces by the British North America Act of 1867. Australia has a federal constitution under which the Federal Government possess limited powers surrendered to it by the federating states and enumerated in the Acts of 1898 and 1900. A token of this constitutional difference is that the Australian federating states still have their own vicegerents of the sovereign in the persons of Governors sent out from Britain, while the head of the Canadian province is in each case a Lieutenant-

Governor locally appointed. Canada has an Upper Chamber nominated for life by the Governor-General, Australia a Senate elected for six years by universal suffrage. The Union of South Africa is a union and not a federation, the former colonies having under the South Africa Act, 1909, become provinces of the Union. New Zealand declined to enter the Commonwealth of Australia, just as Newfoundland has resolutely remained outside the Dominion of Canada.

The second category is those which have not responsible government, being, roughly speaking, Crown Colonies and Protectorates. This class includes the Empire of India, which, however, from its colossal importance and unique influence must be considered by itself. We find that this category includes nearly all our possessions in the tropics (the exceptions are mainly in the West Indies). These are, generally speaking, unfit for European colonisation; they have been acquired by conquest and treaty rather than settlement; their population is enormous and mainly of the coloured races; in several instances they have inherited an ancient and praiseworthy indigenous civilisation; and their inhabitants are votaries of old-world religions of non-Christian type. Considerations of space will necessitate a selection for investigation and accordingly India (and incidentally Ceylon), Egypt, and the Federated Malay States will be taken as typical of this class.

From every point of view there can be no doubt of the importance to the United Kingdom of the Overseas Dominions of every class. Are we a nation of traders? Then let us reflect that of a total world commerce of (say) £5,000,000,000 the British Empire enjoys £2,000,000,000. Of that amount £530,000,000 is with the British Dominions. Of India's share of world commerce some seven-sixteenths (including 64 per cent. of the imports) are with the United Kingdom. Of Australia's over one-half, New Zealand's more than two-thirds, Canada's about one-third, South Africa's nearly three-fifths.

The dominions are all increasing in prosperity from year to year. In the appendix are given some official tables relating to New Zealand which I have selected as showing the wonderful growth of the island dominion. (Since New Zealand is perhaps the most advanced of the democratic dominions, these figures are at any rate not an argument *against* democracy, however much its opponents may protest that New Zealand's advance is solely due to climatic and other natural causes.) No nation of traders can afford to ignore the potentialities of such markets as these.

In the present life and death struggle all the dominions are contributing their *quota* of men, money, and material. The ultra-democratic little dominion of New Zealand has an especial claim to our attention as having furnished more men in proportion to its population of about one million than any other part of the Empire. Her war expenditure is already about £10,000 per day, and her Premier has publicly declared that every man in and every sovereign owned by the Dominion is available for the Empire's use.

I have no wish to burden the theme with superfluous statistics. Typical illustrative examples of these will be found in the appendices, but no one can fail to be struck with the boundless resources of the dominions. Wheat is sent us in profusion from India, Australia, Canada; our dominions sending us about half our total import. Tea from India, Ceylon, and Nyassaland. Butter from Australia, cheese from Canada, meat from Australia and New Zealand, rice from Burma, fruit from Canada and Australia, all add to the food supplies of the home country. Raw materials for our industries are found in wool from Australia and New Zealand, cotton from India and Egypt, jute from India, copra from Ceylon and the Pacific Islands, palm oil from West Africa, rubber from the Malay Peninsula, India, and Ceylon. Of minerals, we get tin from the Malay Peninsula, nickel from Canada, gold from Australia and South Africa.

The list might be indefinitely extended, but not even the most bigoted *little Englander* could deny that the material prosperity and comfort of his little England would be seriously diminished did a natural convulsion plunge all our dominions beneath the seas.

The whole of the civilised world has been shocked by the barbarous explosion of Teutonic fury. Yet 'but for the grace of God' that exhibition of bestial rage might have been ours. A virile and capable race, possessed of vast ambition, rapidly increasing in numbers, hemmed in on all sides, entered the comity of the Great Powers too late to have the opportunity of overseas expansion. Balked by the very circumstances of the case of the power of founding colonies, this race determined to acquire them, ready made, by force from others. To this frame of mind all things were permissible, and outrage and desecration merely means to an end.

The opportunities for expansion we enjoy have saved us from any possibility of such degradation. For ages yet to come the Dominions will afford ample room to the overflow of our population. Our emigrants will find homes under the old flag, and among men of the

same race as free and democratic as ourselves. How priceless are these opportunities, which we avail ourselves of as calmly as we breathe air, is seen from the extreme measures which Germany is willing to take in order to acquire something of the same kind. Unless we are inferior in intelligence and determination to our present foes we shall resolve to retain our Empire and to retain it in the British and only possible fashion—by loyal co-operation among its members, not by the *vis a tergo* of tyrannic compulsion.

One of the greatest advantages which we derive from our Empire is that it serves as a training school for individuals and communities. The training of the individual administrator is best seen in reference to India, but it is going on all over the Empire. In every dominion men are learning the lessons of patience, self-control, tact, and forbearance. They are acquiring the wide outlook of true statesmanship, and are being freed from the narrow parochialism and crude theory of those whose relations are limited by their own boundaries—of borough, county, or country. The dominions themselves as entities are learning something of the same lesson. The more closely knit become the relationships between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, between one dominion and another, the more essential it is that each should understand the other's point of view. Particularly is this the case where other races than the British are concerned. The citizen of the Empire must be taken by his fellow citizens at his worth as a man, without any tinge of race, colour, or creed prejudice. In the inter-relation of different races beneath the flag consists naturally another of the Imperial problems which time and our sagacity must solve if the Empire is to endure.

The questions which have to be solved by us are of three kinds: those arising in each dominion in connection with its internal administration; those arising from its relations with the other members of the Imperial family; and those connected with foreign relations and Imperial Defence.

With the first our central democracy has, in the case of the self-governing dominions, very little to do. The process of decentralisation is complete in these cases. The veto of the Sovereign or his representative is practically a mere figment or at most a reservation of ultimate power never exercised in normal times. The cabinet of the self-governing dominion is responsible only to the electorate of that dominion, and so each works out its own salvation. It decides, as in Australia and New Zealand, in favour of female suffrage. It restricts



the franchise to men as in Canada and South Africa. It has State Railways as in Australia, or powerful railway and land-owning corporations as in Canada. In all these matters our central democracy cannot meddle.

The second and third categories are matters of joint and mutual concern between all members of the Imperial family; and their consideration will be best deferred till we have made our review of the other type of dominion beginning, as is only fitting, with India.

## CHAPTER VI

### INDIA

INDIA is at once the crowning glory and the most difficult problem of the British Empire. It is no mean achievement to rule justly and considerately 315 millions of Asiatics, separated in space by thousands of miles from our own country, and in matters mental and spiritual by an interval strictly comparable to those rolling leagues of ocean through which our lines of communication have perforce to pass. Much has been done, many solutions have been found, but the task of the future promises to be even more difficult than that of the past.

The whole trend of the modern world is towards a greater measure of self-government for all countries and dominions. In those British Dominions over the seas which have been for some time happily in the enjoyment of self-government the contrast with India is vivid, and in their case all signs point to a diminution of the difficulties of the Central Power in exact proportion to the advance in local autonomy made by the Dominions. The Self-governing Dominions are already mainly democratic, and it is therefore only reasonable to suppose that the United Kingdom will be in sympathy with their aspirations to an increasing extent with each advance that the home population makes towards the democratic ideal.

India is in very different case. We have a vast sub-continent with an area of 1,900,000 square miles, comprising every variety of surface and climate, and a population of 315,000,000 composed of members of many different races, speaking many different languages, and professing many different religions. In order to realise even imperfectly the task laid on the administrators of India it is necessary to give some consideration to the topography, ethnography, history, and religions of this vast area and this stupendous population.

A very usual way of bringing home to the mind the area of India is to say that it extends over a territory larger than the Continent of Europe, excluding Russia. (India 1,900,000 square miles—Europe 1,600,000 square miles.) This comparison of area is, however, inadequate unless we take into consideration also the great differences in

surface and climate—much greater than those of Europe—which, with their consequent differences in racial habit and productivity of the soil, bring it about that there is a greater difference between a Pathan of the North-west Frontier and a Burman of Moulmein than between a Norwegian of Bergen and an Italian of Brindisi.

It is convenient to consider the Empire of India as consisting topographically of four regions. These are:—the Himalayan; the great fluvial plain of the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra; the Peninsula proper; and Burma. Each of these has its own range of climate, its own productions, its own distinctive races. ✓

The Himalayan range is from the intense summer heat of the Nepaul jungles or the Dooars to the perpetual snows which at some 16,000 feet simulate the icy barrenness of the Poles. The whole of this region is outside the tropics. Its vegetation includes such sub-tropical species as may be found for example in the Riviera, many of the products of temperate countries, such as oats and barley, and in the greater altitudes the lichens and mosses of Arctic regions. The people are mainly hardy mountaineers of Mongolian stock, with Pathans of mingled Turko-Iranian type on the extreme west and various tribes of mixed ancestry on the extreme east. With the exception of Kashmir, within whose vale of beauty are some of the most effete people in the whole Empire, these are all of fine physique and manly bearing. Among them, such races as the Pathans, the Dogras, and the Nepaulese (popularly styled Gurkhas) furnish most valuable contingents to the Indian army.

The alluvial plain contains the richest and most fertile part of India. The three river-basins—those of the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra respectively—are easily distinguished. Of these three the Indus flows through the least fertile districts. We have the desert of the Southern Punjab, continued and extended to the south and east by Rajputana, arid mother of heroes, and to the south by Scinde, itself partly desert. Nevertheless skilful irrigation has done much to restore to these tracts their lost fertility, and the Punjab is one of the Empire's granaries. It is a matter for surprise to most people to learn that in one particular year (1912) India sent us more wheat than any other country, and that 9 per cent. of the cropped area of India is under wheat, as against 31 per cent. under rice.<sup>1</sup> The Ganges flowing in a generally eastern direction brings fertility with it. The whole of the lower part of its course, rejoicing in an

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix 2E 1.

abundant rainfall, supports a population of greater density than almost any other country in the world. This reaches as many as 900 per square mile. The population varies from the sturdy peasantry of Oudh to the weaker peoples of Lower Bengal, where physique is sadly reduced by the malarial infection due to the water-logged soil. The productions are rich and varied, including coal and salt, indigo and opium, cattle and sheep, enormous quantities of rice, and bamboos, the universal providers of the East, found in plenty in the Sunderbunds of the Ganges Delta.

The Brahmaputra issues in a mighty curve round the east of the Himalayas and flows through a huge valley flanked to the north by the Himalayas and to the south by the Patkoi, Khasi, and Garo hills. The Assam Valley is the renowned home of the tea plant; the lower part of the Brahmaputra is famous for its jute. The inhabitants range from the head-hunting Abors and Nagas of Upper Assam to the Muhammadan ryots of the Dacca district. Equally with Lower Bengal, Eastern Bengal and Assam have vast riches, and the prosperity of Calcutta and Chittagong is largely dependent on the export of produce from these two divisions.

Although the greater part of the Great Plain is outside the tropics it yet has an excessively high temperature during the 'hot weather', whilst the months from November to March, constituting the cold weather, are comparable to an English spring modified by occasional frosts.

The Peninsula proper lies wholly within the tropics and consists of a central tableland, of triangular shape, bounded on the north by the Vindhya Mountains, and on the east and west by the converging lines of Eastern and Western Ghauts. Two rivers flow to the west, north of the Western Ghauts—the Nerbudda and the Tapti. Flowing eastward we have the Mahanuddy, the Godavery, the Kistna, and the Cauvery. No river of the peninsula has either the size or the importance, in history or trade, of the Ganges or Indus. The climate is tropical, showing little seasonal variation, but modified by position from the dry heat of the Deccan to the steamy atmosphere of the plains between the Ghauts and the sea. The inhabitants comprise representatives of almost every Indian race. Among them we find such peoples as the aboriginal Todas and Kurumbas of the Nilgiri clump; the Dravidian Sonthals of Chutia Nagpur; the Aryan Brahmins of Chidambaram and Satara; the semi-Arab Mappilas of Malabar. The productions are varied. Cotton, coffee, tea; teak

and satinwood ; coal, manganese, and gold : are among its vegetable and mineral resources.

Burma resembles the Gangetic plain, being the gift of the Irrawadi almost as much as Egypt is of the Nile. The climate is hot and dry in Upper Burma, moist in Lower. The people are a distinct race, Mongolian in type and Buddhist in religion. Rice is the staple food and the great export. Teak and petroleum add to the riches of the province.

Thus if we survey India's surface we find every variety, ranging from the arid deserts of Rajputana and the Southern Punjab to the water-logged jungles and rice-fields of Bengal : from the austere calm of the snowy ranges to the fecundity of the Mysore Ditch : from the wheat-fields of Lyallpur to the coco-nuts and casuarinas of the Coromandel coast. There is more affinity between the Teuton and the Celt, the Englishman and the Frenchman, than there is between the Toda and the Burman, the Brahmin and the Chamar, the Pathan and the Bengali.

The distance of aeons of our time separates the crude religious feeling of the Sonthal from the highly developed philosophy of the disciple of Vivekananda. The intense personal spirituality of the devout Moslem is the very antithesis of the chill negation of the orthodox follower of Gautama Buddha. The scientific phonetics of the Devanagri tongues contrast vividly with the almost formless clutter of the aboriginal Bhil. History has no record of a united India ; it holds only the story of race after race pouring into the peninsula as the storm waters break over the basin of the hollow lands. Among the 315 millions of her population India reckons 100 races, dozens of religions, and 200 differing tongues. In mental idiosyncrasy and moral characteristics we find the same diversity. Some are warriors by hereditary instinct, some subtle courtiers by the use of generations, some astute traders by the practice of centuries. Some are monogamists, others practise polygamy. Some follow the principles of primogeniture, others allow inheritance only in the female line. Some are frankly polyandrous, among others the wife is secluded from all male gaze save that of her one lord and husband. Many are under an intensely theocratic dispensation. Here the Brahmin is above all. Elsewhere there is an autocracy, sometimes modified by a form of feudalism ; many communities are plainly democratic.

All these diverse elements, racial, religious, linguistic, are inter-

woven and intermingled into that bewildering kaleidoscopic medley which we call India. A lifetime spent in the closest study, the most patient observation, might enable a man of capacity to realise something of one language and its literature, one creed and its rites, one race and its customs. And yet there are those of our race who devote one-quarter of one year to the study of Indian problems on the spot, and return satisfied with their achievement!

There was probably, long ere the dawn of anything like history, an indigenous or aboriginal population, which has in most instances been driven to the hills. If this is so, we should recognise as remnants of such aboriginal races the Todas and Kurumbas of the Nilgiris, the Kandhs of the Eastern Ghauts with their Meriah sacrifices, and possibly the Sonthals of the Central Provinces and the Khasis of Assam. Next probably in order of time would come the people recognised as lying outside or below the castes of Hinduism, such as the classes generally known as Paraiyas in Madras, from which are recruited the sturdiest labourers, the coolie generally, and the servants of the European residents in that Presidency.

We next come to the so-called Aryan invasion. Here the expression 'Indo-Aryan' is a convenient one to denote the type represented by the Rajput, and then, shading off through Aryo-Dravidians, and Mongolo-Dravidians, we come via the Scytho-Dravidian type (including the Maratha Brahmin) to the Dravidians of Madras and the Central Provinces. Races exhibiting the features of these various types are to be found in the several provinces, and the ethnologist can still trace in these strata of population the characteristics which distinguish the types and indicate within certain degrees of approximation the specific immigration by which the type was introduced into India. Through all these groups runs, speaking very generally, the central thread of religious observance which by a process of fusion or average is styled Hinduism.

The other great Indian religion of popular conception and the census returns is Muhammadanism. This is, of course, the outcome of another of those recurrent waves of invasion to which India has been continuously subject. Passing over the early Persian invasions B.C., and the consequent Greek invasions (though these have contributed their quota to the medley of Indian populations), we come to the Muhammadan invasions of which the record has been kept with tolerable clearness and accuracy. These brought in succession Afghans, Moguls, and Persians. India, as known to the cold-weather

tourist, is generally composed of fragmentary recollections of the most striking extant specimens of the architecture of the Muhammadan dynasties who beautified Agra and Delhi. But they did much more than this; they left us an inheritance which has lasted to the present day. Much of our present system of administration, many of our Anglo-Indian customs, the general framework of our Indian army, a great part of our land tenure, we owe to our Muhammadan predecessors. For some time we owed them the language of court, of justice, and of camp, and it is by no means certain that the abandonment of the Urdu-Hindi and Persian in favour of the tongue of Mill and Spencer has been an unmixed benefit either to those who learn or those who teach. But be that as it may, even in their decay the Moguls were a ruling race. Possessed of the genius for empire, they, at their best, expressed it in orderly and impartial administration, and in the keeping of records to which India ere their advent was a total stranger. What the Roman Empire was to modern Europe that the Mogul Empire was to modern India. The greatness of the latter is no more to be judged from the mingled pathos and tawdriness of those closing scenes at Delhi in the middle of the last century, than the austere majesty of the former is properly represented by the licence, effeminacy and debauchery which marked the last days of Roman world dominion.

Just as the sun of British dominion was rising in India there was manifest among the rocky fastnesses of the western hills a stirring which in an almost incredibly short time had rendered the name of Maratha one of dread throughout Hindustan and the Gangetic Valley. From Poona and Satara northward through Baroda and the deserts of Central India, southward through Kolhapur and the Konkan, eastward even unto Calcutta, swept the Maratha hordes, bringing desolation and horror wherever they passed. The Mogul Empire was shattered into fragments by the strokes of those hardy freebooters. Of these fragments some remain to this day as feudatory states of the Indian Empire. Had not intrigue destroyed the unity, and British arms overcome the forces, of this rising Maratha power, there can be very little doubt that great part of India would have passed under Maratha dominion. But British rule was, under the guiding hand of Providence, steadily consolidating the scattered territories it administered. The Punjab with its militant Sikhs, Lower and Upper Burma with their semi-Mongolian Buddhist populations, successively became parts of the Empire, and we have India as it is to-day.

Risley sums up the historic aspect of the case thus :

‘We may look in vain through India’s stormy past for memories of a common political history and common struggles against foreign foes. Wave after wave of conquest or armed occupation has swept over the face of the country, but at no time were the invaders confronted with resistance organised on a national basis or inspired by patriotic enthusiasm. . . . The facts are beyond dispute, and they point to the inevitable conclusion that national sentiment in India can derive no encouragement from the study of Indian history.’ (It is a disappointment and a frustration.)

The huge sub-continent still bears the marks of the movements of influx which have poured into it those successive waves of Dravidian, of Aryan, of Zoroastrian, of Persian, of Pathan, of Mongol, of Briton from over the *Kala Pani*. We still have the aboriginal, with his swarthy skin, his Animist faith, and his simple habits. We still have the Dravidian, with his worship of the local deity, and the Aryan, with his philosophical pantheism, his *Gita*, and his *Maya*. We still have the Parsi with his *Zend-Avesta*, the Sikh with his *Granth-Sahib*, and the Buddhist with his *Sayings of the Master* and his doctrine of merit. We still have the Muhammadan with his Koran, his magnificent devotion to God and His prophet, and his ‘stirring memories of a thousand years’ of dominion. We still have the fiery genius of the Maratha, who once wrecked an empire.

Well might Bābu Bhupendra Nath Bose write in the *Calcutta Statesman* of May 28, 1907 :

‘India is not yet a nation. It is a congeries of races which are not always friendly to each other. We must not forget the ancient hate, the ancient prejudice, the ancient clashing of castes and creeds which still hold India under their vice-like grip.’

From this medley of races, this successive influx of peoples, it follows that till the advent of British rule India never knew peace within her borders. Her history, so far as there are any records or even legends to reveal it, records a succession of invasions. As it has been well put, we have the clash of dynasty against dynasty, the butchery of usurper by usurper, and the overthrow of kingdom by kingdom.

Such is India’s history prior to the establishment of British supremacy. The evidences for this view of India’s immediate past are numerous and convincing. I will quote two instances. The first is from a book written by a Hindu, for Hindus, about a Hindu estate.



This is *The Bansberia Raj*, by Shumboo Chunder Dey, B.A., B.L., of the Calcutta High Court. On the first page of this is the following significant remark :

‘The family fared well during Hindu supremacy, but when like a bolt from the blue the canny Afghan dealt a death blow to the Sen dynasty, it removed to a safer place and lurked there in dim obscurity for centuries.’

Or again on page 5 :

‘This happy and flourishing family incurred the grave displeasure of the reigning sovereign who ordered their total destruction.’

Or page 21 :

‘A reign of terror had begun in this part of Bengal, owing to the repeated incursions of the Mahrattas. . . . Their very name struck terror into the hearts of the residents and was used in the nursery to frighten little children to sleep.’

Or page 27 :

‘The Nawab had two principal agents who exhausted their armoury of cruelty in torturing the unfortunate defaulters. . . . He caused a tank to be dug and filled with everything filthy and noxious. This he called Baikuntha, the Paradise of the Hindus. If any Hindu Zamindar, after having suffered all the other punishments, was still unable to pay the arrears, he was stripped naked and dragged through this infernal pool by a rope tied under his arms.’

The second is from Mr. S. C. Hill's *Yusuf Khan, the Rebel Commandant*, p. 97 :

‘Scarcely had he taken over the administration of Madura when, having carefully considered the troubles which agitated the province, he resolved to arrest them at their very source by an example of severity which would terrify every malefactor. Combining prudence with courage, he calculated that the milder the example the less would be the impression produced by it. He attacked therefore first the least powerful of the rebel poligars, hoping that his weakness would hasten both his defeat and the promptitude of the chastisement by which he wished to intimidate the other rebels. Success justified his expectations. The poligar upon whom he fell could not resist the impetuosity of his attack and offered to capitulate and submit, but Yusuf Khan forced him to surrender at discretion, and then hanged him as well as five hundred of his Kallans who fought for him. These he executed in a single day. This cruel instance of severity frightened the boldest. It is true they did not all submit, but they kept quiet and the province was pacified for the time.’

Those responsible for the maintenance of our rule in India have no light or simple task. First and foremost they have to preserve

order. This involves not only the police arrangements necessary in all civilised countries to prevent crimes against person or property, but also the maintenance of peace between the various jarring sections of the populace. Probably few Britons have seen a Mohurram tazkia procession, or a car festival of some Hindu deity, but many know something of the pre-war sectarian bitterness between Orangeman and Nationalist in Ireland, or the same classes of the population in Liverpool. Imagine this bitterness intensified by racial and climatic differences, deepened by the Oriental fervour and simplicity of religious feeling. Picture this state of things as existing in the India portrayed above, and some conception may be formed of the volcano whose destructive lava the Indian administration has ever and anon to divert into innocuous channels. The war has had the good effect of allaying this mutual jealousy and uniting all in loyalty to the Empire.

Besides this sectarian jealousy, there are other forces at work inimical to law and order. There are wild frontier tribes to be subdued and taught the arts of peace. The wily Pathan, the long-haired Biluch, the Naga or the Shan of the North-east: all present their administrative problems. There are whole tribes within the borders who can only be classified as criminal, whose rehabilitation is one of the never-ending tasks of government. In a population of hundreds of millions, whose diversity is as great as their numbers, this task of preserving order is one of some complexity.

In any survey of India we must sooner or later encounter the picturesque figure of the reigning prince. From the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Mysore, and their compeers, to the smallest baron clinging grimly to his salute of seven guns, these survivals of a feudal past constitute a most important part of India's population, and contribute not a little to the complexity of her administration. The relations of each to the Central Power are regulated by treaty, by statute, by custom, by an inviolable etiquette. Their rights within the bounds thus laid down are strictly observed; their duties are plainly discernible; their old-time mutual jealousies have been obliterated in a splendid loyalty to the figure of the Sovereign; their former autocratic rule is rapidly merging into an enlightened and statesmanlike regard for their subjects which is worthy of all praise and productive of the most admirable administration. British rule has evoked and preserved this loyalty; British comprehension and diplomacy has allayed the erstwhile mutual jealousy; British example has inspired and sustained this statesmanship.

Impartiality is the prime requisite for a successful rule among these differing elements. Neither race nor religion must constitute any claim to favour nor any bar to justice. In the eyes of the law the Paraiya must rank with the Brahmin, there must be no distinction between Briton and Hindu, between Christian and Moslem, between Sepoy and ryot. The Sircar itself must be amenable to the laws it has framed, the poorest peasant and the worst criminal must alike have the right to appeal. The belief in the strict impartiality of justice is an essential to successful administration.

One of our most difficult problems is to preserve an impartiality which shall be real and yet not so austere as to freeze all life. A glance over the comparative figures of religions given in Appendix 4B will show how stupendous is this difficulty. Let us assume that the democratic ideal was at once realised and that universal suffrage was introduced into India. The 218 millions of Hinduised people would provide a permanent majority under Brahmin tutelage. In such circumstances the 67 millions of Muhammadans would fare very badly, while the 100,000 Parsis, representative of much that is best in the wealth and business enterprise of the country, would simply fade out of the scheme of things altogether as far as legislation was concerned.

In no country in the world is it so necessary that the rights of minorities should be most scrupulously regarded. There is a tendency among the English-educated Indians to crave after the representative institutions and parliamentary forms of Great Britain. This is most natural and praiseworthy, but at the present moment the total of their class, of every Indian race and religion, is about 0.3 per cent. of the population. Would they not then be utterly swamped by the remaining 314 millions if our supposed universal franchise were suddenly introduced?

During the long fight over the reformed constitution of the Vice-regal and Provincial Councils the Muhammadans had the greatest difficulty in obtaining a share of representation adequate to their needs and not mechanically proportionate to their numbers. The absurd doctrine of the infallibility of a majority needs very careful watching, and its premature application to India must be most rigorously checked.

In this age it is not sufficient that internal and external peace should be preserved, that justice should be administered strictly and impartially. The country must advance along the lines of modern

progress. Education must therefore be fitted to the needs of the situation. It must aim at the correction of gross superstition inimical to the general well-being, and must not infringe upon any principle of genuine religious belief. It must impart sound ideas of citizenship, including correct notions of sanitation, and the rights and duties of corporations. Its curricula must distinguish between the urban and rural populations ; between the sons of princes and those of peasants ; between those destined to the office or the profession and those intended for agriculture or handicraft. It must hold out a possibility of attainment in the English language and in modern science, whilst at the same time allowing not a shadow of neglect to fall on the vernaculars or the noble Indian systems of philosophy. It must provide recruits for the legal, medical, and engineering professions. It must ensure that there are sufficient members of various government services in all grades from executive to menial. It must, in short, aim at the development of intellect and character and the enhancement of the moral and material welfare of the people. Knowledge has to be spread, and enlightenment in the Western mode to be made a *desideratum* among the peoples ; a high standard of attainment in science, pure and applied, in medicine and in law, to be achieved. All this with a scrupulous regard for the feelings of the people. Such arrangements must be made that the orthodox Brahmin, the sincere Moslem, the devout Buddhist, the earnest Christian and steadfast Jew, the resolute Zoroastrian, may all partake of the intellectual banquet without jostling each other, or of necessity neglecting the Vedas, the Koran, the sayings of the Master, the Gospels, the Hebrew Scriptures, the Zend-Avesta.

Among the myriads of India's population we find certain races, the autochthons of the land who, perennially depressed under the Brahmin dispensation, have for ages been regarded as outside the scheme of salvation. Hewers of wood and drawers of water, the Paraiyas of Madras or the Dheds of Bombay convey a deep and lasting pollution by their touch, nay, more, their shadow. Against them is the chain drawn across the Agraharam, the Brahmin street ; to them are allotted all the most repulsive of the tasks incidental to the life of the community ; the water of the Brahmin well is not for them ; to one dying of thirst such water must be given in a particular way lest the water and the giver be alike defiled by this act of common humanity ; no share of the Brahmin's worship is allotted to them ; their presence in the sacred fane is a pollution so awful as to be almost unthinkable ;

prone in the dust they must fall as the Brahmin passes, lest their shadow profane the awful embodiment of divinity. Souls have they none ; of humanity, in the eyes of their tyrants, scarce a vestige.

It is Britain's self-imposed task to raise these races, to restore to them their self-respect, to replace their servile fear by a justifiable confidence in an impregnable justice, to evoke in them those feelings of humanity and that capacity for self-advancement which ages of ruthless and soul-annihilating oppression have completely obliterated. As a complement to this the Briton generally, whether official, merchant, or missionary, has by precept and, above all, by example to arouse in the superior castes some recognition of a common humanity, some regard for the feelings of those whom they have conquered and so long held in thrall.

Finally, any enlightened Government must aim at the development of the resources of the country. It must, in a land in which individual initiative is practically unknown, take the lead in all experiments for the improvement of agriculture. As the primary and most extensive landlord it must study all the problems connected with irrigation, forestry, fertilisation, breeding, and improved agricultural machinery. It must encourage the exploiting of mineral resources, must maintain a well-equipped Geological Survey, and must, as a branch of its administrative activities, have officials who are experts in the commercial aspect of geological lore. It must encourage all research which has an economic end in view. It must so arrange its legislation, its fiscal policy, its mining regulations, its forest rules, its legal codes, as to encourage and facilitate the development of manufactures. It must plan and carry out lines of communication, whether by water, road, or rail, so as to lend every assistance to nascent or established industries.

One of the most encouraging symptoms of the present day is the way in which indigenous capital is being unlocked. Bombay, Ahmedabad, and parts of the Central Provinces have long had their cotton mills, financed by Indian and Parsee capitalists. Lately, the great Tata family of Bombay have inaugurated two enterprises, which, if their example is followed in other parts, will prove the salvation of India from economic stagnation. These are the great iron and steel works in the Central Provinces and the hydro-electric plant at Bhopole forty-three miles from Bombay, at the foot of the Bhore Ghaut, and the works above it at Lanovla, near the summit of the pass. The necessary capital has been obtained in India, and a quotation from a speech

delivered at Sholapore by Lord Sydenham, then Governor of Bombay, admirably sums up the position :

‘The unlocking of Indian capital for industrial purposes is a great gain. The process is going on, but more slowly than one could wish, and I hope that the time may come when small investors will, as in other countries, be induced to put their savings into sound and profitable undertakings. Estimates of the buried capital in India reach enormous figures. I do not know how far they are to be trusted ; but it is certain that large sums which, if properly employed, would do much to promote the progress of India, remain hoarded. I have been much struck with the difficulty of obtaining it for other enterprises.’

The effect of Lord Sydenham’s intervention was that the shares were rapidly taken up and the Hydro-Electric Power Supply Company of Bombay began its construction works. An excellent (though not quite up to date) account of this enterprise appears in the *World’s Work* for February, 1915, and perhaps the following quotation is permissible. The writer, Rear-Admiral C. F. Goodrich, U.S.N., says :

‘We must not overlook what in some respects is the most significant and encouraging feature, that the scheme is being pushed to a conclusion by native capital almost to the last rupee, that it is purely and in the best sense of the word a *Swadeshi* enterprise, and that the Tata Hydro-Electric Supply Co. is in itself a sufficient refutation of the charge that the Indian people can never get together and pull together. It is this moral consideration which gives this splendid undertaking exceptional importance, because upon its success depends a possible re-alignment of industrial conceptions whose influence upon the future of Britain’s great Empire it is impossible to foretell.’

It is evident from all that has been said above that India has the utmost need of Britain. India is progressing along the path leading to a more democratic form of government. The progress is slow, but not slower than is advisable. It is possible here to quote from the late Sir Henry Cotton, certainly no foe of democracy or of the aspirations of the English-educated among the Indian peoples. He says :

‘The country recoils from such a social revolution as our Western civilisation has thrust upon it. It still needs the hierarchical leadership of caste. The tendency to reduce the power of the dominant classes and to destroy, if possible, all distinction between the different strata of society is much in vogue among headstrong administrators, who are too apt to transplant the radical associations of our democracy into a country altogether unsuited to their

growth. But there is no more patrician *milieu* in the world than that which has for centuries flourished in India and is still vigorous, in spite of attacks upon it.

‘Those reformers who are in the habit of describing caste as the root of all evils in Hindu society overlook the impossibility of uprooting an institution which has taken such a firm hold on the popular mind. They forget that the attempt to abolish caste, if successful, would be attended with the most dangerous consequences, unless some powerful religious influence were brought to bear on the people in its place. They forget also that caste is still stronger as a social than as a religious institution, and that many a man who has entirely lost his belief in his religion, is zealous and tenacious of his position as a high-caste man, and scrupulously performs all customary rites and ceremonies. Caste is now the framework which knits together Hindu society; it is the link which maintains the existing religious system of Hinduism in its present order. The problem of the future is not to destroy caste, but to modify it, to preserve its distinctive conceptions, and gradually to place them upon a social instead of a supernatural basis.’<sup>1</sup>

India cannot do without Britain—that theme requires no further enlargement. Equally Britain has need of India. If it had not been for India the British Empire had never been—at any rate in its present form. India has supplied, from Elizabeth’s reign onwards, precisely that stimulus of which our country has stood in need. To the desire to reach India is due maritime enterprise and discovery. To the struggle to obtain India is due our naval and military supremacy as against Holland and France. To the trade with India is due much of our past and present prosperity and wealth. Without India Lancashire were bankrupt. To our retention of India is due our present Imperial prestige. To our training, in and by India, is due our practical sagacity as administrators. To the reforms introduced by Clive are due first the present splendid integrity of the British official in India, and secondly and consequently, the higher standard of official and political morality now obtaining in this country. Finally, to India we owe the most magnificent example of disinterested devotion and loyalty the world has ever seen. Down through the ages will be handed the splendid story of the scene in the Peers’ Chamber when was read the Governor-General’s message containing that Homeric roll call of India’s chiefs and princes.

From every point of view the employment of the Indian troops is to be commended. It is typical of the unity of Empire. It is

<sup>1</sup> *New India*, pp. 225 and 252.

a tribute to the justice of our rule. It is in no sense the calling of a mercenary horde to the assistance of our tottering power, but the admission of well-trying and proven comrades to the inner brotherhood of our militant order. The valour and worth of these men has now been shown on many a stricken field. India has furnished contingents to the war, not in any sense proportionate to the spirit and desire of her princes and peoples, but in accordance with the express limitations of the Indian army system. Field-marshal Viscount French says of these men:

‘The Indian troops fought with great gallantry and marked success. . . . The fighting was very severe and the losses heavy, but nothing daunted them. Their tenacity, courage, and endurance were admirable.’



## CHAPTER VII

### CEYLON

THE island of Ceylon is so close to India that it seems naturally to belong to it. The railway systems of the island and its gigantic neighbour are now linked together. In fact it is only by the accident of history that the present colony is not a presidency of India. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to acquire part of Ceylon, but were turned out by the Dutch about 1660. The Dutch in their turn were dispossessed in 1798 by the British, who annexed the Dutch settlements to Madras. In 1801 Ceylon was separated from Madras and made into a Crown Colony.

The island has an area of 25,481 square miles and a population of some 4,200,000. The people are of four classes: the aboriginal inhabitants, such as the Veddahs; the Singhalese, who are of Aryan stock coming from India about 550 B.C.; the Burghers, who are descendants of Dutch settlers by Singhalese women; and the immigrant coolies from the Madras Presidency. The Singhalese are Buddhist in religion; the Tamil coolies, Hindu; and along the coast are a few Malays and a larger number of Moormen, who are Muhammadan. The island has two main regions, the central mountain clump and the low-lying coast area. The chief productions are rice, tea, coffee, cocoa, copra, and rubber.

Ceylon is under a Governor appointed from England, who is assisted by an executive council of six, and a legislative council partly elected, partly nominated, of twenty-one members, including the Governor and his executive council. It is thus a modified Crown Colony of the P category (Appendix 1).

The internal problems of Ceylon are those which confront us wherever we rule masses of Asiatics, and are similar in kind, though not in degree, to those we have to solve in India. There are four specific differences. Two of them are due to the former Dutch occupation. From the Dutch we inherit a certain amount of Roman Dutch law, procedure, and nomenclature. Their local descendants are the *Burghers*. Of these Risley remarks:

'Men of the dominant race took to themselves women of the subject race, and the offspring of these marriages intermarried for the most part only among themselves. The Eurasians of Ceylon, who are known locally as "Burghers", are a notable example of the formation of a caste in the manner here described. During the Dutch occupation of Ceylon very few Dutch women settled in the island. This fact, combined with the tremendous penalties imposed by the puritanical Dutch laws on the sin of fornication, induced many of the colonists to marry Singhalese women of the higher castes. The descendants of these marriages ranked as Dutch citizens, and very soon crystallised into a caste, disdaining further alliances with the natives and marrying only among themselves. Conscious of their legitimate parentage and proud of a title which recalls their Dutch ancestry, the Burghers of Ceylon now form a distinct and independent class, standing apart from both Europeans and natives, and holding a position far superior to that of the Eurasians in India.'

I give this passage in full as it incidentally throws much light on the origin of race and caste in India, a subject of perennial interest.

Ceylon differs also from India in having no martial races, and is therefore garrisoned by British and Indian regiments. Finally, the British planting community have made modern Ceylon and are possessed of an influence proportionate to their services.

We have thus to preserve an even balance between the claims of the planters and those of their coolies or the local landowners. We have to administer systems of law in which are intermingled the common law rights of the British, the Roman Dutch of the Burghers, the Hinduism of the Tamils, the Koran of the Moormen, and the prescriptive tribal customs of the Kandyan headmen and their retainers in the hills. With India there are two topics of discussion: the coolie immigration and the import duties, particularly on tea.

With regard to the other Crown Colonies, there are of course local peculiarities, but in main outline they sufficiently resemble Ceylon to enable us to place them roughly in the same category.

## CHAPTER VIII

### EGYPT

EGYPT is of especial interest just now, owing to the abortive Germano-Turkish attacks. The country is, as Herodotus phrases it, the gift of the Nile. From the earliest ages it has figured largely in history and loomed imposing in the imaginations of men. Its situation and general features are too well known to require amplification here. Of greater importance is the history of our occupation of the country. The extravagance of her rulers had plunged Egypt into debt. France and Britain in the interest of the foreign bondholders exercised a joint control over the finances of Egypt. Arabi Pasha, an ardent Nationalist, resented this control, and in 1882 inspired a rising. England having in vain sought the aid of France was obliged to intervene alone. The rising was quelled and British troops were left to prevent any similar occurrence. Britain was now actually, though not nominally, mistress of Egypt and responsible for her safety. The late Lord Cromer was appointed British Agent, and it is to him that Egypt owes its present prosperity. The fanatics of the Soudan were finally crushed in 1898, and since then the territory, held jointly by Egypt and Great Britain, has advanced with rapid strides.

The relations of Britain with Egypt are thus seen to present a striking instance of that anomaly and lack of logical definition which are so characteristic of the early stages of the growth of British influence. They remained in this condition till the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, threw in his lot with the Turks, and, inspired by German intrigue, placed himself outside the pale of British mercy. He was summarily deposed, Egypt made a Protectorate, and a member of the Khedivial family—Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha—proclaimed as *Sultan*, free from the irritating and futile suzerainty of the fast vanishing Turkish power. The Soudan remains a *condominium*. Great Britain accepts the fullest responsibility for the defence of the territories under the Sultan against all aggression whencesoever coming.

A formal Protectorate is thus declared. The revision of the *capitulations* is to be deferred till after the war.

The importance of Egypt to the British Empire arises from its position at the gateway of the East. The strategic control of the Suez Canal is vital to the safety of our shipping. It is therefore essential that the country should have a strong, well-balanced government, and the total excision of the corrupt and effete Khedivial régime is to the decided advantage both of ourselves and of the people of Egypt. Now that the complications due to the suzerainty have vanished and that those due to the conjoint system of European justice and finance are soon to be removed, the problems of Egypt will be entirely domestic. We have as heretofore to ensure impartial justice to all, to the 10,000,000 Muhammadans as to the 1,000,000 Christians or the 40,000 Jews. We announced, in proclaiming the new Sultan, that 'the religious convictions of Egyptian subjects will be scrupulously respected', and that 'the strengthening and progress of Muhammadan institutions in Egypt is naturally a matter in which His Majesty's Government take the deepest interest'. *Naturally*, since the Government of His Britannic Majesty are, in one way or another, responsible for some 90 millions of Muhammadans, far more than those owing allegiance to the Sublime Porte, and nearly double the population of the British Isles.

There are two other tasks on which we have entered in Egypt. One is to raise the industrial standard by completely utilising the resources of the country, more particularly by regulating the flow and enhancing the usefulness of the waters of the Nile. The immense works at Assouan and Assiout; the improvements in the Nile delta works which have added so greatly to the prosperity of the Fayoum are already evidences of what is contemplated.

Our other task is to raise the educational standard, so as to combat ignorance and superstition, without in any way offending religious or racial prejudice. As the people advance educationally so will they be more and more fit for an increasing share in the government of their country. Much that was said under this head in the section on India applies *mutatis mutandis* to Egypt also.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE MALAY STATES

FOR a better understanding of the political situation in Malaya, it is necessary to explain the relations that exist between the British authorities and the native rulers. The Peninsula is divided into a British Colony (comprising Singapore, Penang, Province Wellesley, the Dindings, Malacca, Labuan, Cocos Islands, and Christmas Island—the last three being outside the Peninsula), a Federation of four Protected Native States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang), and five Independent Native States which are under British suzerainty (Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, Perlis, and Johore). The Colony's affairs are presided over by a Governor, who is also High Commissioner to the Native States, acting in that capacity as the medium of control for the Colonial Office. Under the High Commissioner, whose headquarters are at Singapore, the affairs of the Federated Malay States are directed by the Chief Secretary residing at the Federal capital, Kuala Lumpur, in Selangor. A Federal Council, comprising the native rulers and their British advisers, as well as representatives of the planting and mining interests and the general community, sits periodically to pass enactments and to consider the Budget. In each of the four States there is a British Resident to aid the Sultan in the administration of affairs, and in each State there is a Council composed of officials and unofficial representatives of the leading industries. In Johore there is a British official known as the General Adviser, and in Kelantan, Kedah, and Perlis, British officials designated as Advisers. These officials are members of the Federated Malay States Civil Service, and their advice is followed by the native rulers. To the Sultan of Trengganu an officer of the same service is accredited as British Agent. He represents British authority, but takes no share in the administration of affairs, which are entirely in native hands.

The Portuguese and Dutch pioneers of western civilisation in the

Far East did nothing to develop the resources of the Straits. Whatever development took place between the first contact of Europeans with the country until the latter part of the nineteenth century was due to the industry and enterprise of adventurous Chinese, who mined gold and tin in a rough and ready fashion and lived in a state of society bordering on anarchy. It was not till after 1873, when the British Colonial authorities intervened in the internal affairs, that order was evolved out of chaos and the real government of the country was established on a firm and lasting basis.

The Federated Malay States have been able to effect enormous developments—the creation of an efficient Civil Service, the construction of excellent roads, the building of a well-equipped railway system, the erection of splendid residences for the Sultans and of public offices in Kuala Lumpur, Taiping, Seremban, Klang, Pekan, and elsewhere; the construction of waterworks and deep-water ports and other works of public utility. All this has been done without resorting to public loans, being a feat almost, if not quite, unparalleled in the annals of British Colonial administration; and it is satisfactory to note that a similar policy is being followed in the Protected Independent States. So prosperous are the Federated Malay States that they have advanced over one million and a half sterling to Johore for the construction of the railway through that State, and have lent £4,000,000 to Siam to build a railway in Southern Siam to connect with the Federal system on the northern frontiers of the native states of Kelantan and Perlis—railway connections which will facilitate international trade and have a beneficial influence in the development of the Federated Malay States. On December 31, 1912, the Federated Malay States had a net surplus of about £7,500,000 sterling, some of it invested in gold and some in Indian securities.

The above account, taken from an authoritative official publication, shows clearly what can be done by honest, clear-headed British administration. The problems of these States are threefold. First, by tactful handling to induce and maintain in the native chiefs a sympathetic attitude towards the various schemes of amelioration and enrichment of the community. Secondly, to allay the mutual jealousies of the chiefs and ensure cordial co-operation among them. Thirdly, to arrange and supervise the enormous immigration required to work the tin mines, coco-nut plantations, and rubber estates. This, of course, in addition to the ordinary work of administration of a tropical province with a mixed and fluctuating population. Inci-

dentally it shows, by contrast with the less go-ahead colony of the Straits Settlements, how superior are men to systems, and how important it is that the man on the spot should be given a free hand, unhampered by too many official restrictions.

Of all the dominions in this class, the Federated Malay States are alone in having both the inclination and money to present a capital ship to the British navy, as an earnest of their gratitude for the excellent government they enjoy.

## CHAPTER X

### INDIAN PROBLEMS

IN Appendix 4 is given in tabular form the scheme of the Government of India. It will be seen that in essence this is despotic, the King of England being Emperor of India. Actually there are two safeguards against any real despotism. The Governor-General has no access to the Sovereign save through the Secretary of State for India, so that, nominally the Emperor's vicerent, he is in very fact to a large extent subordinate to that Minister. The second safeguard consists in the responsibility of the Secretary of State to Parliament. This means that as a member of the Cabinet the Secretary is bound to give, when called upon, an account in Parliament of his advice to his Sovereign or his instructions to the Governor-General. This was dramatically the case in the historic debates in the two Houses over the Delhi proclamations, when, although respect for the august person of the Sovereign imposed certain restrictions on the speakers, there was ample evidence of the reality of parliamentary right, at least, openly to criticise. Incidentally the proceedings at the Durbar were most surprising in the form they took. By the advice of His Majesty's Ministers, on the initiative of the Governor-General in Council, the Sovereign announced his Imperial will. The conception of the changes emanated from the Government of India, received the personal and individual sanction of the Secretary of State, was tendered as respectful advice to his Majesty, was granted the Sovereign's august approval, and was finally announced as a decision of His Imperial Majesty. In all this there is no hint of any necessity for a preliminary Parliamentary discussion or sanction. Is this to be regarded as a precedent? If so, it will have the most important and far-reaching influence over the peoples of India.

It must always be remembered that to the Indian races Government is Sovereignty, rule a personal matter. Even before the assumption by the Crown, the East India Company had to be personified by the average Indian as *Fahn Koompani* before he could grasp its status as a ruling entity. The abstract authority leaves him cold and unmoved.



The personality of the Sovereign arouses his intensest devotion. Can there be any doubt that the glorious outburst of enthusiasm we have recently witnessed, if not actually originating in, has at any rate been rendered deeper and more fervent by the recollection of their Majesties' dignified, gracious, and sympathetic presence in India? The Viceroy as the personal delegate of the distant but beloved Sovereign is a figure intelligible to millions, and his commands receive a respectful attention, which is impossible in the case of mere parliamentary abstractions.

'What orders for me and mine?' should be legibly inscribed on the walls of the Secretary of State's Council Chamber as a visible embodiment of this personal attachment.

The first great problem of Indian administration is then to enhance this *visibility* of the Sovereign to the masses of India without in any way impairing the constitutional safeguards. A British Empire pre-figured in the person of the Sovereign will for ever contain as a member an India fanatically loyal to that person. A British *rule* represented by the wrangling of Parliament or the hasty visits of semi-educated members will be the constant object of intrigue and attack.

It would, however, be utterly unfair merely to arouse this loyalty. Our rule must prove itself worthy of it. We have for our own purposes summoned India from the isolation of centuries and the abstraction of ages. We have brought her into the circle of the modern nations with their search for wealth, their restless keenness of invention, their desire for progress, or at any rate change. We must see to it that *our* India deserves its place in this circle. We must so train her people that they may be worthy fellow citizens of the children of all the dominions. We must so strengthen their powers and initiative that they are no longer to be exploited by any adventurer who chooses to inflict himself upon them. We must so develop India's natural resources, and so train her people to develop them, that the country may become rich and powerful. A country having the vast natural resources of India, which can yet only afford to raise an imperial revenue of 7s. 6d. a head as contrasted with New Zealand's £11, or the United Kingdom's £4 5s., has still boundless opportunity for development. Much has yet to be done before India, with an external trade of £1 1s. per head of her population, is raised to the status, as a producing country, of Canada with £28, the United Kingdom with £29, or New Zealand with £42.

The task then is threefold. First, to explore, to test, to prove the resources of India. Next, to realise as an asset those resources, to overcome the rooted diffidence of the Indian which impels him to hoard rather than to invest. For a thoroughly prosperous India we must have indigenous capital. To say this is in no way to ignore the valuable services rendered to India by the British capitalist or to subscribe to the economic fallacy of the 'drain'. For example, the expenditure of capital on the tea estates has been something like £40,000,000, nearly all of which has been deposited in one form or other in India to fructify in various ways. The estates spend annually some four and three-quarter millions sterling in India; nay, more, the gardens in the plains spend an average of 7s. per acre, or 6s. per coolie, in providing medical assistance for their workers. The corresponding figures for hill gardens are 2s. per acre and 2s. 4d. per coolie, a striking tribute to the climatic difference. This would mean that tea companies in India spend every year about £170,000 on the maintenance of health among their workers. In other words, every pound of tea produced in India means four and four-fifths pence spent in the country, of which one-sixth of a penny is medical expenditure. These figures should, I think, furnish food for reflection to those who proclaim against all fact and reason, that India's use of British capital is a drain on the life-blood of the dependency.

Lastly, we have to train the Indian as a manual worker, as an agriculturist, as a mechanic; and, most important of all, as a supervisor and skilled employer of others. This trenches on the subject of educational reform which will be most conveniently dealt with later, but it may be pointed out here that one cardinal defect of our present educational system is that it has ignored *training* and devoted itself chiefly to *instruction*. Sound schemes of technical education are necessary, and already these have received a good deal of rather spasmodic attention.

If we are to aim at this material prosperity for India we must devote much attention to the banking systems. The existing European joint-stock banks fulfil very admirable functions. They enable the ordinary commerce of the country to be carried on smoothly and effectively. They are available for all legitimate purposes of the great British merchants. But, with exceptions, they are out of touch with the people. They are useless to the agriculturist or landlord. Their resources are not applicable to, nor their advice available for, indigenous enterprise. To say this is to cast no shadow of reproach

upon them, but it is to indicate that there is ample room for banking enterprise of another type. Accordingly, recent years have seen the development of new style banking along two distinct lines. The first is concerned with the land banks and co-operative loan societies which have been started in various districts under the aegis of the local administration. I can refer the student of Indian economic conditions to a very valuable paper on this subject, read by Mr. Fremantle, I.C.S., before the (London) East India Association. These banks are sound, and are doing admirable work. Their extension will mean the gradual redemption of the ryot from the grasp of the avaricious *bunnia* or *sowcar*. Until 1912 co-operative societies were not allowed to deal in anything but credit. Now they are free and the resultant development of supply societies has meant that almost all over India co-operative societies supply seed, manure, and milk; while kindred societies have been formed to encourage the breeding of cattle.

The second is the so-called *swadeshi* banking enterprise which has recently been very unpleasantly prominent. The scandals which have occurred have demonstrated clearly two important facts, namely, that our educational system has failed to evoke or instil a real appreciation of the fundamental principles of banking and economics, and that from this it follows that *swadeshi* banks must be under strict official supervision till these principles are appreciated and acted upon. The whole subject is under consideration, and no doubt a practical procedure will be evolved. It must always be remembered that the economic salvation of India lies in the employment of indigenous capital, to which the *swadeshi* bank is indispensable. This, if properly run, will prove of inestimable value in educating the people to invest instead of hoarding. Every instance of fraud, failure, or faulty finance on the part of any of these banks must lessen public confidence and so check the tendency on the part of the Indian public to avail themselves of modern facilities for the employment of their surplus wealth. Most Indian people are naturally thrifty, but are also timid. Long centuries of pre-British oppression have taught them a rooted distrust which it is difficult to eradicate. It is, therefore, the plain duty of Government to take such steps, legislative or administrative, as may be necessary to the growth of sound indigenous banking and of a reasonable confidence in its probity and efficiency. It is gratifying to note that official India has now moved, since a strong Commission is now touring India to examine the possibilities of further industrial development in India, with special reference to possible openings

for the profitable employment of Indian capital. Sir Thomas Holland (late head of the Geological Survey) presides over this Commission which has already collected a mass of valuable information.

If indigenous capital is to be encouraged it is equally important that British be not discouraged. Not only would it be unfair to place obstacles in the way of British enterprise, it would also be unwise even from the point of view of the native investor. The British-owned factories, steamships, railways, tea gardens are object-lessons in what can be done by intelligence and skill. To imitate them in their merits and to avoid their defects should be the aim of the budding Indian manufacturer. If, then, the scale is to be held level as between the British and Indian investor, Government must have strong research Institutes. The one at Pusa is doing good work for the technics and science of agriculture, and there are others, but more is required. There should be systematic enquiry into all possible natural materials, their capabilities and their commercial possibilities. It is true that this is done spasmodically by the provincial governments, and monographs are from time to time issued. These attract very little attention and are soon consigned to oblivion. What is required is a well-equipped miniature Charlottenburg to which the possible raw materials of industry could be sent from all over the country, where they could be tested, in which experts could be trained, and whence such experts could be sent to any locality where, to investigation or skilled guidance, there was promise of economic reward. At the suggestion of Dr. Dunstan of the Imperial Institute, agricultural colleges are to be established, probably in *Ceylon* and the *West Indies*, to train Englishmen as managers of tropical estates. Cannot India do something similar? The bamboo, for example, has infinite possibilities as paper pulp, as a basis of medicine, even as food; and yet the bamboo is still merely a jungle plant, and the possibilities of cultural enhancement of its value in any district have never been tested. In this connection Mr. William Raitt, F.C.S., Cellulose Expert to the Government of India Forest Department, calls attention to the fact that for some years past an extremely fruitful investigation, economic and scientific, of the resources of the Indian Empire in raw materials for cellulose and paper pulp has been in progress at the Research Institute of the Indian Forest Department. The materials tested and approved of include bamboo, Savannah grasses, and Himalayan spruce and fir. It has been proved that they are the cheapest raw stocks in the world, and are in most districts associated with

extremely favourable manufacturing facilities. The quantities are enormous; in Burma alone it is estimated that the bamboo areas within economic range of river transport could produce 12,000,000 tons of pulp per annum. Mr. Raitt shows that from the grasses alone unbleached pulp can be made at a cost of about £11 per ton. As compared with the cost of European pulp this leaves a margin of £2 to £3 for freights and profits.

The cane-sugar industry only requires skilful handling for India to occupy the same premier position with regard to sugar as it already does in the case of tea. In Bombay and Madras there are canes whose produce can compete successfully with that of Java and Mauritius. Northern India has a wider area under sugar but an inferior cane. There is now an expert in Government employ, and his investigations should result in a marked improvement in the status and quantity of Indian sugar.

The possibilities of cotton growing in India, the improvement of the staple, the increase of the crop, are all subjects worthy of attention. In the Rajputana irrigation districts experiments have been tried with encouraging results. If in time we can make the growing of long stapled cotton in India a success we not only add to the wealth of the country but also help to insure the whole British Empire against the consequences of foreign cotton shortage or cotton gambling. The association which has been formed for the encouragement of the growing of cotton within the Empire is doing good work and the Indian Agricultural Departments must continue to co-operate with it. That there is ample scope for development will be seen when we reflect that of 2,200,000,000 lb. of cotton imported into this country in 1914 only 104,000,000 were from India (see Appendix 2 E. 6).

The possibilities of the coco-nut industry are enormous. Sir William Lever says :—

‘I do not think in the whole world there is a promise of so lucrative an investment of time and money as in this industry. Given reasonable precautions and care, there is very little risk of failure in coco-nut planting, and a large amount of capital is not required.’

The coco-nut industry is very little developed by British capital. At present most of the estates are run by native planters financed by Chinese and Indian moneylenders. Scientific methods would add very much to the productivity of the plantations. It is estimated that in 1912 coco-nut products represented a value of about £70,000,000. It may be noted that the world's output of gold was about

£100,000,000, and of rubber about £40,000,000. Of India's yearly export of copra, four-fifths have hitherto gone to Germany.

India's mineral resources largely await development. She has immense coal and iron fields just beginning to be effectively worked. Even her production of the *rare* metals is not negligible. For example, a single small district of Burma is capable of supplying more than half the world's annual requirements of tungsten. When the war began we had only very imperfectly developed the output in this area, and were blindly handing over the entire quantity produced to German agents dwelling either on the spot or in London. Tungsten is found in wolfram ore, and is used as an alloy of high-speed steel for machine tools. Tungsten-steels, which possess self-hardening properties, are also used for heavy guns and armour-plate. Deposits containing wolfram are found all down the coastal districts at the extremity of Southern Burma, but especially in the district of Tavoy. We have held this region for nearly a hundred years, but only ten years ago the entire mineral exports of Tavoy consisted of one ton of tin ore annually produced by Chinese coolies. The first trial sample of wolfram was shipped from this region so recently as 1908. By 1914 Burma was producing 2,326 tons of tungsten ore out of a total world consumption of about 9,000 tons. It all went to Germany, for the Germans had quietly stepped in and acquired the whole output.

On the outbreak of war the Tavoy industry almost collapsed, for the processes by which tungsten was extracted from the ore existed in Germany but not in this country. Although tungsten had become practically an essential element in the making of munitions, we were actually sending the ore to the Germans and buying back the finished product. Steps were gradually taken here to remedy these deficiencies, and meanwhile the Government of India turned their attention to the wolfram industry in Burma, which had never been handled with energy. Sir Harcourt Butler, the new Lieutenant-Governor of Burma now has the problem vigorously in hand. He is spending money liberally, making new roads, with temporary wooden bridges, in all directions, and doing his utmost to increase the output. Tavoy, it is said, now 'hums with life', and the German interlopers have vanished.

The powers of the Government of India to override ordinary economic considerations are exemplified in their decision to assume direct control of the export trade in wheat. This has resulted in the steadying of prices and the prevention of anything like a 'corner'.

In the fight against famine, as in the development of resources, railways are of the first importance, while their strategic value to the defences of India must not be overlooked. Two questions have to be solved. These are the comparative desirability of State and Company lines, and the question of gauge. These are matters to be left to the expert. Military opinion must pronounce on strategic values, from which the other two questions are inseparable. The battle of the gauges has long raged, and such authorities as Sir Guilford Molesworth and the late Lord Roberts are strongly against breaks of gauge. The *desiderata* are plain ; to have such systems (whether Company or State) as will enable men, material, produce, and commodities, to be transported with the maximum speed and the minimum expense and amount of transhipment.

Finally, the arts and handicrafts of India must be fostered. Mr. Havell, late of the Calcutta School of Art, has written much on this subject, and, without agreeing with all his views, it must be acknowledged that he has certainly made out a very strong case against our past and present handling of this particular question. It is idle to dogmatise on so thorny a subject as the theory and economics of 'Art Industry', but every one who has lived in India must lament the decay of the indigenous weaving ; the vulgarisation of the metal-worker and the wood-carver ; the bastard offspring of Burma and Birmingham, which is presented as the highest achievement of the modern Indian worker.

There is one more aspect of the economic question which must be indicated, namely the fiscal. There is no branch of our administration in which greater injustice has been inflicted on India.

Take the question of the currency. It is doubtless in many ways advantageous to have the rupee a token coin, practically stable and independent of the fluctuations in silver values. Yet the rise in the value of the rupee has meant a less number of rupees per unit of produce or commodity exported. For example, when the rupee was only worth 1s. 2d. every bag of seeds sold for £1 in Britain meant 17 rupees to spend in India. Now it means (at 1s. 4d.) only 15 rupees. And the purchasing power of the rupee in India is not increased (to say the least) by the change. The official currency policy has been mainly directed towards the protection of India Office interests in England. Reference may be made to the answers of Mr. Abrahams and other witnesses before the 1913 Royal Commission on Indian Finance and Currency. Again, when as a matter of revenue-

raising a tariff was imposed on Indian imports Lancashire, the home of 'Free Trade', insisted on a countervailing excise duty being imposed on all cotton manufactured in India. It must be remembered that the Indian tariff was in no sense *protective*, so that actually Lancashire obtained protection against India, a proceeding strictly analogous to that which in the bad old days ruined Ireland's industries. It is essential that India's raw materials should not continue to pass into enemy hands. Sir Guy Fleetwood Wilson has mentioned £23,000,000 as the value of Indian agricultural produce and manufactures which might be advantaged with suitable tariffs. The question of a heavy export duty on produce to enemy countries should be seriously considered.

If we desire to treat India fairly we must grant her the same fiscal autonomy as is enjoyed by Australia and Canada. If we do not allow this we must drop all hypocritical pretence of ruling India for India's benefit, and state clearly that we will not allow her to nurse her infant industries lest they grow to manhood and strangle our own.

In this connection we come to another problem pressing for solution—the question of the more even distribution of population and the provision of labour for industries requiring it. Incidentally this will bring us into contact with Ceylon and the Straits.

There are certain districts where, owing to various causes, population presses heavily on the means of subsistence. Such are some of the sun-scorched plains of Madras. The Madras villager is perpetually on the verge of famine. He is a patient toiler and capable of a good deal of endurance. The Singhalese are apathetic and disinclined to work for a wage. The coffee-planters, and later the tea and rubber planters, of Ceylon, therefore imported labour from Madras. This Tamil immigration has proved a veritable godsend to the island. In the same way from the Northern Circars many thousands of 'Klings' have gone to the Malay Peninsula, where they work side by side with the Chinese. Not only so, but the West Indies, Fiji, Natal, have all indented on India for a supply of labour in substitution for their fickle and indifferent indigenous populations. Thus the Indian immigrant has enhanced the prosperity of far distant colonies.

In these cases the Government of India has offered every facility to the recruiting agencies, which are, of course, under the rigid supervision of both the Indian and Colonial authorities. A steady stream of immigrants from India is maintained, whilst there is a counter-current of those returning often vastly enriched as the result of their labours.



This is all to the good in many ways, but India properly organised from the economic standpoint would be able to find lucrative employment within her own bounds for all these industrious workers. There is a prevalent impression among those responsible for, e.g., the tea industry, that Government has not always assisted that and kindred industries to find labour. It is difficult to see why the Government of India should not organise an inland immigration department to which all questions of labour relating to Assam or Darjeeling, the Jheriah coalfield or the Bombay dock construction, could be referred. This department would have full powers to protect the coolie against all fraud or injustice, while having at its disposal ample statistics of, on the one hand, requirements, and on the other, supplies of labour, it would be in a position to advise and assist both sides. It is certainly unjust to treat such splendidly humane institutions as the Assam tea gardens (with their resident doctor, hospital, commodious, and sanitary coolie lines) as if they were slave-drivers dependent on heartless crimping for their labour. The time-expired coolie in Assam often settles down there and becomes an agriculturist or petty trader of considerable local importance, thus permanently relieving the population pressure elsewhere and adding to the stability and prosperity of his adopted province.

Incidentally we have touched on the fringe of the education question in its relation to industry. It has, however, the most vital connection with the whole problem of the efficiency of our rule. If we could devise a perfect educational system there would be very few problems left to solve. Perfection is, of course, unattainable, but we can at any rate eliminate defects as we find them. There can be no doubt that in our zeal for impartiality we have taken the soul out of our Indian education. We must not impose upon the people a Christian, Moslem, or Brahmin scheme, therefore we must have a strictly *undenominational* education. In practice this works out to a godless imparting of secular instruction, void and empty of any dram of spiritual worth, moral training, or character-forming influence. The *desideratum* is a scheme whereby the pupils may be trained to morality, and the spiritual part of their nature satisfied, through the medium of their own faith and its own instructors. There are difficulties in the way, but they can surely be overcome. Any effort is worth while which holds out promise of improvement on the present godless curricula.

Next the primary and secondary systems require strengthening and improving. At the present time attention is too exclusively focussed

on the university curricula, so that schools are ill-staffed and the pupils ill-taught. Instead of concentrating the whole of the imported English members of the educational services on university work there should be in each capital of a district a Government school complete in its primary, middle, and high departments, the head of which should be a trained English graduate. The subject must not here be unduly enlarged upon, but much of the so-called unrest of recent years is due to faulty education.

The various Christian Churches have problems to solve in India. The Church of England has made some beginning towards a solution by the appointment of the first Indian bishop. The Indian Church must in all probability progress along its own lines, and there seems no valid reason why those should be essentially Western in character. Christianity is Asiatic in origin, and its European development should not prevent us from a frank recognition of much which is akin to primitive Christianity in Indian habits and modes of thought.

With regard to foreign missionaries the Supreme Government must decide whether these should not be discouraged in view of the fact that many of the German missionaries are emissaries of the baser forms of *Weltpolitik*.

All these considerations—industrial, economic, and educational—are but as preliminaries to our great work in India—the advancement of her people to the status of a self-governing unit of the Empire. There are two paths we may tread.

One is to rule as rules the East—to have always a member of our Royal House as Viceroy, and to give him despotic powers unfettered by Parliamentary control. That at the present day is manifestly impossible.

The other is gradually to train the people to a realisation of the meaning of civic duty, to a greater self-reliance, to a fitness for our ideal democracy.

The task is gigantic. Not for many generations will the end be in sight, but in the self-contained Indian village community we have the beginning which may be developed into that full civic responsibility at present only very faintly realised. We have some seven hundred municipalities in India which enjoy a restricted autonomy. These spend some £5,400,000 between them, whilst local boards handle nearly £4,000,000. It is incumbent upon us so to train the natural leaders that they may perform their duties in an honest and disinterested fashion. In this connection it cannot be too strongly

emphasised that any administrative scandal in England has a very mischievous influence in India. It is our honesty which gives us our Indian prestige, and we cannot without hypocrisy point out the defects of Indian members of Local Boards if our own *izzat* is blackened by bribery, corruption, or defalcation on the part of men similarly situated in England. Gradually as skill in municipal affairs develops the trader will rise in the social scale. In India the trader, the merchant, and the millowner are very poorly represented on municipal and legislative councils, largely from their own indifference.

If we aim at the speedy introduction of democratic machinery into India, let us at least have some prevision of the probable effect of our changes. To have at once anything like an electorate in India would simply mean turning the existing caste organisations into huge caucus groups moving in obedience to wires pulled by demagogic upstarts. Votes would be given to order, or not given at all, according as the leaders of the caste determined. The recalcitrant voter would be ostracised. The tremendous machine which exhibited its power in the quasi-religious sanction given to boycott would be employed to prevent such a one from eating, drinking, marrying, or amusing himself among his fellows. The powers by which the Papal interdict blighted England in the reign of John are still extant and exercised in the caste organisation. The free elector would not exist, or if he did exist would do so with none of the amenities of existence and would terminate his life with none of the customary rites.

But we can find an instance of the failure of an electoral system much nearer home, namely in the bulky volume containing the report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. This report states that there is very little interest taken in the guardians' elections, so that there is no effective public criticism. According to a statement prepared by the London County Council, the percentages of the respective electorates voting at the various elections were: Parliamentary 78·3, county council 55·5, borough council 48·2, guardians 28·1.

The Commissioners conclude, therefore, that the system of direct election has not succeeded in giving us local authorities who have an adequate appreciation of the difficulties and responsibilities which beset the administration of the Poor Laws. Instead, they recommend that in future the members of the local authority shall be largely nominated from among men and women of experience, wisdom, and unselfish devotion to the public good.

If this is so, if in a certain direction the electors of England are

unworthy of their privileges so that a system of nomination has actually to be recommended, have we any warrant for hastily superseding the nominative system in India? Certainly not in the history of the scheme devised in 1893 for the Legislative Councils, which was designed to give representation to the views of different races, classes, and localities, through the medium of corporations vested with definite powers upon a recognised basis, or of associations formed upon a substantial community of legitimate interests. Under this scheme such bodies as the municipalities, the universities, the chambers of commerce, were to return members. In the year just preceding the introduction of Lord Morley's reforms, the district boards returned only 10 landholders as against 36 lawyers; this out of a total of 54. The municipalities grouped together, out of 43, returned 40 lawyers, two landholders, and one merchant. Thus out of 97 representatives, 76, or more than three-fourths, were lawyers. This is even worse than the home position and indicates a direction in which change is imperatively necessary, if adequate representation is to be provided for the various classes of the population. The late Lord Minto, while Governor-General, declared his unshakeable opinion that any electoral representation in India would be doomed to mischievous failure which aimed at granting a personal franchise regardless of the beliefs and traditions of the communities composing the population of the sub-continent. Sir Bampfylde Fuller has well said :

‘In India there is no effective feeling of deference to a numerical majority. Would ten Brahmins submit themselves to the inclination of eleven Mussulmans or eleven hundred Pariahs?’

The Royal Commission on Decentralisation demonstrated the necessity for a greater devolution of legislative and administrative power on the provincial authorities. This, of course, involves the enlargement of the constitution and scope of the Provincial Legislative Councils. In the dispatch, embodying those views of the Government of India by which the Emperor of India was actuated in the Delhi proclamation, we find the case admirably summed up :

‘In the course of time the just demands of Indians for a larger share in the government of the country will have to be satisfied, and the question will be how this devolution of power can be conceded without impairing the supreme authority of the Governor-General-in-Council. The only possible solution of the difficulty would appear to be gradually to give the Provinces a larger measure of self-government, until at last India would consist of a number of

administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above them all.'

As India progresses towards this state of things she will find ample expression for the political aspirations of her people, while each province may consult its own idiosyncrasy as to the exact mode of that expression. Nevertheless the pace must not be forced. The progress must be natural and in proportion to the advance in civic attainment.

The British Government in India must remain as the sole final authority. Not only is the British power alone capable of keeping the peace, but British impartiality alone is untouched by, and austere aloof from, the jarring interests of the various classes which make up India's heterogeneous population. The maintenance of strong British control is therefore to India's interest, and no scheme of devolution can be a success which does not recognise that fact. A parallel may be drawn with the United States in which Federal is comparable to British authority, and State right to the provincial autonomy.

The question of provincial autonomy is complicated by the existence of the Native States. Some 600 States contain two-fifths of the area of India, and about two-ninths of its population. They vary in size from Hyderabad with 83,000 square miles down to States in the Bombay Presidency having an area of a few acres. Some are directly under the Government of India, others the Provincial Government to which they are nearest. Some pay tribute, most do not. All are bound to us by treaties, agreements, or understandings, the honourable discharge of which constitutes a well-fulfilled duty on either side. Many maintain forces, part of which as Imperial Service Troops are auxiliary to the regular Indian Army. The fervid loyalty of the Chiefs and their devotion to their Sovereign has recently been most strikingly demonstrated.

The pressing problem with regard to the Chiefs is how best to avail ourselves, for the common good, of their intimate knowledge of the native temperament, their exalted position, and the reverence in which they are held by the people. They should be closely associated with the Viceroy, not only in matters of ceremonial but on questions of legislation. It is true that there is in nominal existence an advisory council of the Chiefs, but its functions have fallen into desuetude. Some method must be devised of at once gratifying their natural ambition and utilising their undoubted power and influence.

We thus come to the last question proposed to be dealt with in this section—the army, which necessarily is under ‘Federal’ or absolute British control. The constitutional position of the Indian Army is very interesting. By the annual Army Act, under which alone Parliament authorises the standing British Army and regulates its size, the number is fixed exclusive of the numbers actually serving within His Majesty’s Indian possessions. Thus there is no statutory limit to the Indian forces. The question now arises: Should we not avail ourselves of that absence of limitation greatly to increase the size of our Indian Army? A total of 160,000 men (with in addition 36,000 of a reserve, 40,000 volunteers, and 21,000 Imperial Service troops—a grand total of some 257,000 men) is ludicrously small. Yet the military services cost India some £20,000,000 yearly, or about 36 per cent. of the total expenditure from Imperial revenues. (This, of course, includes the cost of the 75,000 British troops stationed in India, as well as of the Royal Indian Marine.) It is difficult to see how the Indian revenue can stand any further charge under this head. On the other hand, the splendid Indian regiments must not be allowed to sink to the dangerous and anomalous position of mercenaries which they would occupy if paid, even in part, out of British revenues.

The magnificent response made by the whole of India to the German menace is reflected in the heroism and worth of the Indian troops at the front. The admission of the Indian soldier to European warfare, the granting of commissions to Indian officers, and the bestowal of the V.C. on the sepoy and the sowar, as well as the private and trooper, are significant of much in that new India which lies before us in the coming years.

It is not within the scope of this paper to attempt a determination of the future of the Indian Army, but the question will have to be faced, including the re-organisation of the present ‘Volunteer’ forces. The Indians of the educated classes are clamouring for the privilege of serving as volunteers, and with a section of Parsi volunteers now at the front, it is difficult to see how their wishes can long be ignored. Generally speaking, India after peace will be a new India indeed, and it is possible that it will be a more united India, in which the claims of many sections to fuller privileges of citizenship will be more valid and more insistent than they are at present. Those claims must then meet with every sympathy and consideration. In a united Empire the last scintilla of the old Roman differentiation between citizen and subject must be extinguished. We must not be influenced by the

recent recrudescence of anarchist violence; which is partly due to German intrigue and partly to the recollection of that subservience to agitation already referred to.

We have given a brief view of the more pressing Indian problems. It now remains in the next section to deal with those problems which concern the relations of the Central Power to the Dominions and of the Dominions to one another.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE CENTRAL POWER AND THE DOMINIONS

AS we have seen it is only with the external relations of the self-governing dominions that our central power has to concern itself. It is true that theoretically there is nothing to prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom legislating for the internal affairs of a colony, but practically this is never done and never will be done now. There are also certain classes of laws which must be reserved for the Royal pleasure. Such are those relating to divorce, currency, and the Imperial forces of the Colony. These instances are so unfrequent that they may here be ignored.

There are four main questions which must be dealt with, and in each of these India has a prominent share. These are :

1. Trade regulations, including the question of tariffs and subsidies, with the most important matter of an Imperial Customs Union.
2. Imperial Defence, including the relation of each dominion to the others and to the United Kingdom.
3. The mutual rights of subjects of the various dominions, including the right of entry and settlement. This last concerns not only India but certain of the Crown Colonies, and is intimately connected with the general question of emigration.
4. The question of the re-organisation of the India Office and the Colonial Office.

The United Kingdom is 'free trade'. The constitutionally governed dominions are protectionist. Here is one fundamental difference which has to be got over. India has no voice in her own fiscal arrangements. Her enormous export of raw materials largely goes to foreign countries.<sup>1</sup> Her indigenous industries are swamped by imports from the United Kingdom and the *dumping* of manufactured goods from other sources. The Straits Settlements have a free export of tin and rubber. The Federated Malay States derive their fiscal prosperity from a duty on those exports. Is there any possibility of reconciling all these differences, of inaugurating a system under

<sup>1</sup> See e. g. Appendix (2 D)—Cupra.



which the Empire might show a solid fiscal front to the outside world? It must be remembered that the United Kingdom is practically alone in the civilised world in its adherence to free imports. Do the circumstances of this country differ so fundamentally from those of Australia and New Zealand within the Empire, and the United States and Germany without it, that free imports are necessary to us and prejudicial to them? Or are all these other peoples suffering from mental aberration while we alone are sane? Ought we to rejoice in the increasing amount of British capital employed abroad? Should we not rather endeavour to find some means of encouraging the employment of that capital in the United Kingdom and the Dominions?

These are the questions which present themselves to the most casual enquirer. Their solution requires care, skill, and impartiality. We must dissociate from them all tinge of home political bias and must not suppose that economic wisdom is the sole prerogative of any one Party. To solve them is to forge new links for the binding together of the constituents of Empire. To 'bang, bolt, and bar' the door in the faces of the Dominions is not only ungracious but dangerous. If we are to deal fairly with India we must aim at fostering her industries and utilising her resources for *her* benefit, and not selfishly for our own or carelessly for that of foreign countries. Can we not have, to consider the question, a strong committee of British business men and manufacturers, Colonial experts, agriculturists, and statesmen; and Indian officials and (English and native) Indian merchants and manufacturers? Such a committee should collect facts, statistics, and opinions. It should formulate a decision. That decision should be subscribed to by all parties and in all our Dominions. It should be promptly acted upon and honourably adhered to.

Democracy is generally weakest where the question of defence is concerned. It is only natural that this should be so. It requires special knowledge to realise the meaning of foreign preparations. It requires special training to appreciate the necessities which such preparations impose upon us. Such training and such knowledge are necessarily beyond the reach of the average citizen, and the mass of the people are perforce ignorant of much as to which the Cabinet are well informed. It was by a very wise prevision, therefore, that the Constitution of the United States made the President commander-in-chief of both the army and the navy. He of all men should be effectively in touch with those foreign relations on which naval and

military policy should alone depend. The weakness of the position in the United Kingdom is shown by the fact that the preparations in the Self-governing Dominions are normally far ahead of those in the Central Power. The fatal subservience of the Party leader to the vote-catching necessity leads to a snubbing of the expert and a stifling of the national conscience which lulls every one into an oblivion of the real facts of the case. With regard to Lord Haldane, we are confronted with a very unpleasant dilemma. Let it be at once acknowledged that he did much as Secretary of State for War to enhance efficiency and to enable the expeditionary force to act promptly and strike hard. There is probably no ground for demur as to his standard of quality. It is when we come to the question of numbers of men and quantities of *matériel* that the dilemma presents itself. Of all living Englishmen Lord Haldane is probably the best acquainted with Germany. Was he then hypnotised by a subtle German influence that he allowed his colleagues to delude (in their abysmal ignorance) the country as to the meaning of German policy and the extent of German preparation? Or did he deliberately suppress his knowledge and refrain from emphatic warning, merely out of loyalty to his party and in deference to the supposedly widespread objection to adequate war preparation? History must decide, but the reference is here necessary to indicate the danger which in all schemes of Imperial Defence must be carefully guarded against.<sup>1</sup>

*Imperial Defence*, like Imperial fiscal policy, must be taken out of the domain of party politics. This granted, let us see what are the respective rights and relations of the constituent parts of the Empire.

First and foremost the United Kingdom must, failing all other resources, defend each and every one of the Dominions against foreign aggression. In Chapter VIII is a reference to our acceptance of this responsibility with regard to our newest and most important protectorate. The Admiralty have rightly pointed out that in the general naval supremacy of Great Britain is the primary safeguard of the Dominions.

This necessity of defence involves the King's prerogative. In the Sovereign is vested all power of raising troops. This prerogative extends even to the Dominions beyond the seas. It is, however, limited here by the Army Annual Act, the preamble to which enunciates the principle that a standing army in time of peace only

<sup>1</sup> Lord Haldane would appear to have furnished the solution of the dilemma in his article in the *Nation* for August 7, 1915, to which the reader is referred.

exists by permission of Parliament. In India, the Indian revenues are not, without the consent of Parliament, applicable generally to the cost of military operations outside the external frontiers of India. In the Colonies the settlers are equally protected against the abuse of the prerogative by the application of the Common Law, so that the consent of the local parliaments is necessary to the raising of troops. The whole matter is well set forth by Professor Morgan in an article in the *Nineteenth Century* for March, 1915, to which reference should be made.

It is evident that this obligation to defend our Dominions imposes a heavy strain on the 46 millions of our home population, while, as we learn from the circumstances attending the genesis of the great American Republic, it is useless to expect the Dominions to pay British troops, which they do not and cannot control. Accordingly local land forces of a regular type are maintained by India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. There are *volunteers* in India and some Crown colonies such as Ceylon and Malaya. Certain dominions have inaugurated a naval programme. The necessity for this has arisen from the concentration of the British fleet in home waters. Australia, New Zealand, and Malaya have contributed ships. New Zealand and Malaya have made their ships an integral part of the British navy both in peace and war. Malaya, of course, cannot furnish *personnel*. Australia's navy is to be local and, except in emergency, under local control. Canada is still debating her Canadian Naval Aid Bill. We have here a striking example of that diversity of method which local autonomy necessarily implies. Co-ordination is equally necessary and has been to a certain extent achieved. Australian cadets should come to Osborne and Dartmouth, and we might even look forward to seeing a native-born Australian First Sea Lord.

The value of the Colonial fleets has been conclusively proved, and it may perhaps be urged that India should have her own navy. She had one once, which did good service in coast work and the suppression of piracy. There are maritime races in India capable of furnishing men of whom British discipline would make excellent sailors. The present Royal Indian Marine is employed only in trooping and survey work. An obvious difficulty in the way of the rehabilitation of the Indian navy is the question of expense.

Now how are we to co-ordinate and regulate all this British and local effort? Something has already been done. Since 1909 we have

had an Imperial General Staff, which links up the War Office with each General Staff in the Dominions. We have also a committee to deal with the problems of Imperial Defence. This committee is informal and of undefined constitution and limits. It is a distinct move in the right direction, inasmuch as members of the Colonial Conference and of the Parliamentary Opposition may form, and have formed, part of its *personnel*. It is thus Imperial and non-party.

Probably in giving permanence to this committee and enlarging its constitution and powers will reside the most effective way of dealing with our defence problems. On the one hand, we must have such arrangements as will ensure at need the most speedy and effective disposal of all our Imperial resources. On the other, we must not by over-organisation cripple the initiative, and cramp the voluntary action, of the Dominions. Would it not be possible to have some scheme of Imperial Defence which should involve the pooling of some part of the resources of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Dominions for that express purpose? Perhaps a fixed proportion of revenue or the produce of a particular duty might be funded and placed under the control of the Defence Committee. We could then arrange for expenditure where and as it was needed, and not, as now, where and as it is possible. The Indian army (and navy) might then be robust actualities and the Colonial forces might be adequately developed. The magnificent response to the Empire's need recently made is convincing proof of the enduring nature of the ties between us, and it would be a grave error if a soulless officialdom were substituted for that generous loyalty. When it is remembered that legally the Colonial land forces are only liable 'to service within the boundaries of their own dominions'; and when we reflect that the possibility of Colonial neutrality in a British war has actually been discussed, it will be seen how far the spirit transcends the letter of the law. It was certainly laid down by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in the Canadian debates that 'it was for the Parliament of Canada, if she created a Canadian navy, to say not only where but *when* it should go to war'; thus supporting most emphatically the ultra-autonomous view that Colonial neutrality in an Imperial war is a possibility to be reckoned with. These extremist views have been shattered by the actual onset of war.

Is there such a being as a citizen of the British Empire? If so, is there any colour distinction? These questions have to be faced boldly

if we are not to be confronted with the spectacle of a species of armed neutrality between certain of the Dominions. Is an Indian taxpayer of Calcutta or a Straits-born Chinaman equally a citizen of the Empire with a Londoner or a 'Cornstalk'? If he is not, why not? If he is, by what right does South Africa impose restrictions on his entry and settlement? By what right does New Zealand impose a poll-tax of £100 on a Chinaman, even though he hail from the Straits? Why are Sikhs refused admission to Canada?

The answer from the Colonial standpoint is easy. It is because Colonial Britons desire to keep their dominions as the breeding place of white men only, and in the unfettered exercise of their autonomous powers take such steps as seem necessary to that end.

We may then carry the catechism a degree further, and enquire why Australia imposed restrictions on the landing on her shores of skilled workmen from other parts of the Empire. The answer from Australia is promptly forthcoming. Because she desired to protect the native Australian workman from undue competition.

Now it is possible to sympathise very fully with the Colonial views on this question and yet to realise that these restrictions may inflict intolerable hardship and humiliation. Is the Sultan of Johore, running horses at a Melbourne race meeting, to be denied entrance while his English jockey is allowed to land? Is an Australian jockey to make money in India while an Indian rider is denied similar opportunities in Australia? Is a high caste Hindu, a graduate of Oxford, well known as a speaker at the 'Union', only permitted to come into Natal under regulations degrading to any civilised and self-respecting being?

It is evident that a *modus vivendi* must be sought and found. India has already, and rightly, retaliated on Natal by stopping emigration to that colony. The new India of *post-bellum* activities will be little inclined to abate its claim to full rights of citizenship. The association of Indian, Englishman, Canadian, and Australian on the battlefield, while it will lead to a better understanding, will certainly not tend to strengthen the Colonial position. How will John Smith, Canadian, feel when he learns that Dharm Singh, Sikh, to whom he owes his life, has been rejected with contumely from Canadian shores?

It is possible that an outlet for India's surplus population may be found in East Africa and the Soudan. Here there would be room for many millions of Indian workers who would add to the wealth of

the tracts they occupied. For a full discussion of this question reference should be made to an article by G. H. Lepper in the *Empire Review* for September, 1914. If the question of mass Indian emigration were thus satisfactorily settled, Indians and Chinese of standing might certainly have facilities for visiting, travelling in, or even settling in, the various dominions.

In Chapter V reference is made to those vast tracts of unoccupied land in the Self-governing Dominions. It is of Imperial importance that these tracts should be occupied by happy, healthy, industrious populations of British blood, adding to the resources and ensuring the safety of the Empire. To that end the Central Government and the Dominions must earnestly and wisely co-operate. The United States furnish us with a striking object-lesson of the difficulties brought about by a too cosmopolitan and polyglot immigration, and her difficulties thus caused can be avoided by us. We want a reasonable immigration of sober British citizens possessed of ambition and determination. We do not want a dumping down of a mixed assortment of unskilled labourers to be employed during the busy times of harvest and cast adrift when those times are over. Australia has already made a move by her schemes of agricultural training, her irrigation colonies, and other wise plans, and the other dominions have each something similar in preparation or operation.

The emigration question is particularly important just now because there will be some million or so discharged soldiers on our hands when the war is over. It will be an Imperial disgrace staining our name for ever if these men are left to drift. There are indications already that the majority of them will desire an outdoor life. Therefore the Dominions and the British Government must combine to make in good time the necessary arrangements for their reception in the Dominion of their individual choice. A movement for ensuring this is already on foot and is deserving of every encouragement. The benefit to the Dominions of the accession to the population of a large number of trained, disciplined men in the prime of life is not capable of exaggeration, and it would constitute a fitting reward of heroic service that such men should be enabled to own each his own 'bit of the Earth'.

A most important set of considerations are those involved in the relations between Whitehall and Delhi, the Colonial Office and Pretoria, or the same office and Singapore. The India Council Bill brought forward by Lord Crewe was to improve the machinery of the

Council. Lord Crewe proposed to have a maximum of ten members of the Council and a minimum of seven, of whom two should be Indians. Another feature of the Bill was the extension of the category of *secret* business which the Secretary may transact without reference to the Council. Thus if it had passed the Bill would have strengthened the Secretary as against the Governor-General and the members of the India Council in London. Lord Curzon pointed out that the Bill was based on a misconception of the function of the Council. Policy should be initiated by the Government of India and only checked by the Council in London. It is evident that if India is to advance towards the same degree of autonomy as the Self-governing Dominions the Secretary of State for India must find his powers and those of his Council considerably curtailed. If questions of defence are handed over to the duly constituted Committee of Imperial Defence, there will remain very little for the Secretary of State to do. It might then be advisable for the Colonial Secretary to confine his attention to the Crown Colonies, while all the Self-governing Dominions and India had a department to themselves. Some changes of this kind are probably inevitable in the near future. It is gratifying to know that the representatives of the Dominions are unanimous in favour of India's permanent and adequate representation at all future conferences.

The deportation of the labour leaders from South Africa is an example of a kind of exercise of local autonomy which might possibly impair the relations between a colony and some foreign power and thus involve the mother country. It is therefore typical of much in our mutual relations which the Imperial Conference might well discuss.

Such are some of the problems which lie before us. In the final section must be attempted some estimate of our Democracy's capacity for dealing with them.

## CHAPTER XII

### CONCLUSION

WE have now considered Cleon's *dictum* and the circumstances of its utterance. We have glanced at the constitution of the ancient state and have seen what history has to say. The lesson of history seems to be that it is extremely difficult for a democracy to manage widely extended dominions. Generally speaking this difficulty is due to the conflicting personal and quasi-parochial interests of various sections and groups of the people. These require for their adjustment either a burning spirit of patriotism or an unshakeable authority applied from outside the various sections. Particularly in time of war is this weakness of democracy most evident. The remedy, failing such a patriotic spirit as animates the various Swiss races, is the appointment of a dictator whom all must obey. Otherwise both in peace and war the democracy degenerates into an oligarchy, mostly composed of place-seeking politicians, whose numbers multiply with each new vote-catching scheme which is thrust before the public, till the Cabinet becomes unwieldy from its size and incapable of strong action save in those directions which are recognised as likely to lead to the applause of the unthinking mass of the people. It is difficult to avoid 'government by class', as each section comes up in turn for its share of the rewards of party loyalty.

Carthage fell because of the internal jealousies of its people, which led to inadequate support of its best leaders. Rome perished because it had lost its ideals, and instead of training the people to civic duty pandered to their baser desires, and substituted material boons for proper government. Thus rulers, army, and people alike were corrupted and lulled into slothful and vicious ease. The supreme test of strength is found in war, and all the impulses of democracy tend naturally towards an oblivion of the possibility of conflict, an avoidance of the discipline necessary to success, and a devotion to the softer arts of peace. When a ruder, sterner race attacks, the rotted fibres of the democracy cannot stand the strain and the nation goes down before its assailants. Unless indeed there arises the one strong man who can



redeem the situation, and then there is always the danger that a tyranny will be the natural outcome of his successful efforts.

Some space has been given to a consideration of the modern democracies including our own. We have attempted a sketch of the British Empire, its constituent parts, and their various problems. We have seen that, in contradistinction from the empires of antiquity, our Empire has no foundation in aggression or military domination. It is probably in the Act of Henry the Eighth throwing off the papal supremacy that the term *Empire* is first used—'This realm of England is an Empire'. Employed in this place it means that as an Empire it stands of itself, free from allegiance to any foreign power, spiritual or temporal. Since that time, in increasing measure, Empire has meant, and should mean for us, Liberty of the subject and Independence of the nation. In the words of Ravana, the Rakshasa, spoken of Rama, our Empire is 'of noble mind, the friend of all creatures, not disdaining the help of the lowliest'. We must now endeavour to formulate some conclusion as to the possibility of our democracy ruling our Empire.

It is necessary to realise as a preliminary that the present war has greatly changed the average man's outlook on most things. In the first place, this is a war against tyranny. Therefore one result of a successful issue for us should be an extension of liberty in the world. In all probability Poland, Finland, Alsace-Lorraine will enormously benefit in this way. Further, since the tyranny we are warring against is dynastic and militarist, we shall see an impetus given to democracy. Finally, since our avowed object is the championing of the small nationality, our victory ought to go far to arrest the process of absorption which up to the end of the last century seemed almost a law of nature.

On the other hand, we have seen how hideously more expensive it is to be caught unprepared for war than to make adequate preparation beforehand. We shall therefore in all probability see such arrangements made, in other countries beside our own, as will ensure at any rate a reasonable respect on the part of possible foes. In this country there will be after peace too many ex-soldiers for the sneer at the soldier's profession to be any longer very popular.

The new army is very different from the old. Formerly it may be said that, roughly, we recruited our privates from one extreme of society and officered them from another. We had a professional army. Now the social position is in many instances reversed. Intelli-

gence of a high grade is in the ranks together with social position. The officer is no longer mainly from the nobility or gentry, but also in increasing numbers from the 'middle classes'. There are many families in which one son is an officer and another a private. There is scarcely a family throughout the length and breadth of the land which has not an 'army man' among its members. This means an immense difference in the point of view not only of the man who will return from the war, but of the family he has left on going and will rejoin on returning.

Our relations with foreign Powers will be revised. Our old-time apprehensions of Russia will have vanished. In our various dominions there will be changes. Some of these have already been vaguely indicated. India will feel the stirrings of a spring awakening. All the Dominions will be bound to us by fresh ties, in the recollection of our conjoint effort and our kindred dead. To those dead we owe a heavy debt. They died to preserve our freedom, to ensure in the next generation a world in which the individual and the nation were not manacled and stifled. How shall we pay that debt, and how best deserve that dearly bought freedom? Will it not be by training ourselves and our children as those of our race, who died with our names on their lips, would have had them trained?

This new world will have to be faced by our democracy. History teaches us that a democracy has never governed an empire with success. The modern world shows us much of tyranny and corruption under democratic forms. Yet, to use an expressive vulgarism, our democracy has *got* to manage our Empire. We must not shirk our task. That task is to bind the Dominions more closely together and neither to allow the Empire to break up through our indifference, nor to urge it to destruction by our excessive zeal.

As already indicated one great means to that end as far as India is concerned is the extension and strengthening of provincial autonomy. Recently we have had proposals for giving an executive council to the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. This has much to commend it since the newest Lieut.-Governorship, that of Bihar and Orissa, has both executive and legislative councils; and the opposition to the plan strikes the observer as being based on conservatism rather than sagacity. The democratic element certainly appears here to have had more of the true instinct than its opponents. Nevertheless the bitterness of reference in some sections of the Press is to be deprecated. To refer sneeringly to those who have held high office in

India as the 'dead hand of the superannuated, obstructing Indian reform', is to exhibit ignorance of that necessity for caution as to changes in India which has been shown to be so necessary. It is time we recognised the futility of political attack and the need for sincerity in co-operation. The British people has a genius for compromise; and for united action a certain amount of mutual concession is always necessary. With regard to none of the thorny questions which beset us are this compromise and this toleration more necessary than in the case of Ireland. The antagonism between the extremist views on the question is complete, and yet some basis of reconciliation must be found if we are not to be torn in twain with civil conflict.

Since our democracy is called upon to manage our Empire, it is essential that it should be acquainted with the domains it is to manage. A brute tyranny may obtain where there is ignorance, but our Empire is based on reason and justice, and therefore knowledge is the prime requisite. It is appalling to reflect that the lives and destinies of three hundred millions of Asiatics are to be influenced by us, and yet that not one in a thousand of us has any knowledge, or wishes to have, of them and their country.

Our aim must be to inculcate a sane and intelligent patriotism. Our educational system must include the instruction of our children in the extent and meaning of our Empire. We must take a pride in the achievements of our race. We must aim at making the sense of duty paramount over the selfish claims of individual and class. We must seek to eliminate from our party system its more objectionable features. We must train our public men to a wider outlook and a more truthful exposition. We must learn a wise toleration, and a sympathetic outlook on the customs and desires of the myriad differing peoples who cluster under the august shade of our banner. We must abolish the *doctrinaire* and outworn shibboleth, and substitute for it the dispassionate consideration of each problem as it presents itself.

Above all *we must never make Imperial questions a matter of party.*

The first requisite then is a thorough overhauling of our educational machinery. As far as instruction is concerned a knowledge of the Empire and its constituent parts must be insisted on. Not only in the primary, but also in the secondary and public schools, is this necessary. Does the average pupil of any type realise how we are

fed from outside? (Appendix 2 E). I have ventured to put into diagrammatic form some few of the marvellous statistics connected with our Empire production. I would plead that something similar should be in every school. In the public schools we teach the pupils to revere the memory of Leonidas and to trace the boundaries of Augustus's dominions, but very rarely do we lead them to the equally heroic figures and more widely extended boundaries of our own Empire. In the primary school till quite recently patriotism was forbidden and the Empire a thing to be ashamed of. Among the parents ignorance of our comparative welfare was so complete that it was quite common to hear (presumably intelligent) voters say they would as soon be under German rule as British!

Let our democracy then wake up to its shortcomings in this respect. Let the minister of religion and the schoolmaster cease to pander to a cowardly shrinking from our obvious responsibility. Let them insist upon this knowledge for their people. Even the most obtuse of officials—and not all officials, even in Education departments, *are* obtuse—will yield to the pressure of public opinion.

Equally with knowledge we must have training.

Not once or twice in our rough island's story,  
The path of duty was the way to glory.

Duty must be the keynote to endeavour. And this not only of the primary school and the proletarian. The pupil of the University requires the stimulus, as does his junior of the grammar school. The merchant has to learn that life has other things than the so ordering of business as to obtain the largest commissions. The manufacturer has to acquire a sympathetic understanding of the people he employs, and to comprehend that he has a wider duty than merely paying a minimum wage.

Having, then, an educated and trained people imbued with a real sense of duty, we must next revise our political system. There are subjects which must be kept outside the realm of party politics. India, Defence, Tariffs, are some of these. They should be in the hands of composite bodies, on which all parties are represented. It should come to be as much *bad form* to prostitute them to party ends as it now would be to distribute business prospectuses in Church, or to carry samples to a dinner party. Courage will then come, courage to tell the people the truth.

We must learn to trust the man on the spot. Surely the ad-

ministrator who spends his life grappling with local problems must know at least as much about them as the callow youth from a crammer's who drafts minutes, or the hoary politician who trims his sails according to his idea of the prevailing wind of popular opinion. We have taken a step of the gravest import in our alliance with Japan and in admitting our Indian fellow subjects to the privileges of our fighting line. This step has called forth bitter reproaches from our enemy, who accuses us of deserting the white man's cause. We have not deserted it. We have ennobled it in proclaiming that the old coloured races no longer exist only to be exploited by the white man. What we have proclaimed in time of stress we must uphold in time of peace. An almost divine sympathy and insight will be necessary in order to avoid the most hideous blunders. That sympathy and that insight will most surely be found in competent men who have studied the problems on the spot. No shibboleth, no party loyalty, must stand in the way of our support of such men—whether appointed by the Party in power or not. Certainly (to take an obvious instance) in the case of the various Canadian arbitrations our kinsmen have reason to deplore the distrust of local opinion, local wishes, and local authority which has from time to time been shown. Such mistakes as were made in these arbitrations must in the future be sedulously guarded against.

Then we must see to it that our Press is worthy of the nation. Under democratic conditions the Press, equally with the politician, is tempted to tell the people what it is imagined they wish to hear rather than what they ought to hear. The sane-minded man is deafened with the discordant cries of the rival organs. The Press only occasionally attempts to estimate comparative values. It often gives as much prominence to the advertisements of quacks, tipsters, and turf commission agents, as to the most weighty utterances of eminent men. It reflects the popular prejudices at the same time as it serves to strengthen them. It is for the people themselves to decide whether this shall continue, but if our hypothetical training in duty is accomplished we shall have made the purging of the Press not only possible but inevitable. It is conversely necessary that those in authority should use the Press in the proper way. If we *are* a democracy then we must recognise the right of the people to all reasonable information. The mystery man has become extinct in medicine and is fast becoming so in theology and psychology. Let him equally vanish from the realm of politics and government. There is nothing so terrible as the

blind rage of the mob which shouts: 'Nous sommes trahis'. There is nothing so majestic as the calm step of a people which marches steadfastly on its destiny, fully knowing the intended end and the means whereby it will be achieved. The Press must in increasing measure educate the public to a knowledge of that end and those means. ✓

A people so educated will face without blenching the cruel necessities which lie before us when, the long struggle ended, we turn our attention again to the arts of peace. If we are to hold up our heads among the nations we must increase and multiply, must replenish our exhausted stock of vigorous manhood. The needs of the nation must overbalance the selfish individualism which imposes a 'prudential' check on natural increase. And above all we must, even by methods surgical in their incisiveness, restore both here and in the wider dominions, the balance of rural to urban population. A healthy, thriving, contented countryside is the mainstay of a nation, but such is impossible under present economic conditions. We must cease to offer blindly our incense at the altar of that 'Manchester' school who bade us, in all good faith, turn our merry England into a workshop fed by the kindly contributions of the uttermost corners of the earth. Our Oversea Dominions also must have their rural population, and we must see to it that that population is British.<sup>1</sup>

The nation thus revived must learn a rare self-abnegation. It must not only subordinate self to duty but it must learn emphatically to leave others to manage their own affairs. It requires not only sympathetic insight but self-denial to allow that alien methods may be as desirable as our own. Possibly an illustration from the field of foreign missions may be useful. In the middle of the last century it was widely held that (e.g.) India and China were the abodes of benighted heathen, whose faiths were of the Evil One, and among whom civilisation was non-existent. Their only hope of salvation lay in the adoption of our religion, our ways, our civilisation, our mode of attire. A change has come over the missionary attitude in this connection. It is now recognised that the individuality of a people is worth preserving. It is seen that the laws of Manu or the teachings of Confucius were not wholly foolish and futile; and that the Bhagavad Gita may contain something of wisdom. Men realise that after all character is more than doctrine, that an upright life is more likely

<sup>1</sup> Of the 92,000,000 of people in the United States, 32,000,000 are of foreign extraction, and of these 10,000,000 are of German origin.

to attract men to Christianity than all the learned polemics of all the professors of theology, and that the Asiatic Christian, while as worthy, may differ somewhat from the European.

In the same way we must recognise that Australia may be right in its tariffs, South Africa in its particular defence scheme, and the Hindu in much of his caste regulation. Even in the terms of peace the Dominions must have a voice, and their point of view is already in some instances being put forward. We have seen by the light of the holocaust of martyred Belgium whither nations are led by the desire to impose on others their own institutions, and the sight should make us determine to avoid that fatal error. The mass vote is too often swayed by the attractive sophistry of unpractical men who seek to impose on whole peoples some system, the ultimate issue of which is only faintly, if at all, foreseen. This is a danger against which in our domestic, as in our Imperial policy we must always be on our guard. Our best defence is that self-abnegation, that subordination of the ego, in which lies the root of the highest patriotism. It is self, eager for immediate advantage, which falls a ready victim to the quack peddler of the political nostrum. Our people and its leaders must learn the lessons of history, and avoid the mistakes which have ruined our predecessors. The jealousies of Carthage and Holland, the materialism of decadent Rome, the luxurious socialism of Peru; all these we must shun.

If we recognise our task and face it in the right way we shall find our nation adequate to the demands made on it. The flag of our Empire will still mean, as it has meant before, Protection, Justice, and Liberty. It will still be possible for the dusky ruler in Central Africa to join with the hierophant of mysterious Lhasa in prayers for our success, because under Britain and with Britain is such a peace and such a justice as they have nowhere else seen. If we shirk the task and shrink from the training then our democracy will not long rule our Empire. In us are the seeds of the future, and ours is the responsibility for its character. Only as we approach more closely to our ideal of democracy will that character approximate more nearly to desirability and permanence.

# APPENDIX

1. Every effort has been made to secure accuracy, and the India Office, and the offices of the Dominion High Commissioners have been consulted. The statistical appendices are however designed rather as illustrations than as the last word in meticulous accuracy.
2. The bibliography is intended for the interest of the general reader. A large number of works consulted on various points of detail have been omitted as not possessing this interest.
3. Special acknowledgement is due to those Dominion authorities and publishers who have kindly granted the use of material belonging to them.

## APPENDIX 1. BRITISH EMPIRE STATISTICS

### EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS USED.

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| A. Population per square mile.   | Q. Crown Colony having both executive and legislative powers vested in the Governor.                     |
| B. External trade per unit of population.  | R. Protectorates. Under indigenous domestic control, but under control of Crown for all foreign affairs. |
| C. Acquired by Treaty Cession.   | S. Spheres of influence. Indigenous rule but expressly exempt from the attempts of all foreign powers.   |
| D. " " Conquest.   | T. Condominium.  |
| E. " " Annexation.   | W. Revenue (by taxation, &c.) per head of the population.  |
| F. " " Occupation.   | X. Education, particularly primary.  |
| G. " " Settlement.   | Y. Military Service or training.   |
| L. Constitutional Monarchy.  | Z. Percentage of urban population.   |
| M. Empire under Viceroy.   |  |
| N. Dominion having Responsible Government, i.e. a Cabinet responsible to the people of the Dominion.       | (1) Religion—Christianity.   |
| O. (1) Crown Colony having elected legislative assembly and nominated executive council.                   | (2) " Hinduism.  |
| O. (2) Crown Colony having nominated executive and partly elected legislative council.                     | (3) " Muhammadanism.   |
| P. Crown Colony having Governor and both councils nominated by the Crown or by the Governor for the Crown. | (4) " Buddhism.  |
|  | (5) " Confucianism.  |
|  | (6) " Heathenism, not further classified.  |




# APPENDIX 2 A. BRITISH EMPIRE STATISTICS


	Area. Sq. miles.	Population.
1. United Kingdom . . .	121,390	46,550,000
2. Rest of Europe . . .	122	231,000
3. India . . .	1,900,000	
{ British N. Borneo. . .	31,100	
{ Brunei . . .	4,000	
{ Ceylon . . .	25,481	
{ Cyprus . . .	3,600	
{ Hong Kong. . .	390	
4. Sarawak . . .	50,000	
{ Straits Settlements . .	1,660	
{ Federated Malay States .	27,700	
{ Feudatory " " . .	14,300	
{ Johore. . .	9,000	
{ Weihaiwei . . .	300	
	2,067,531	323,600,000
5. Canada . . .	3,729,665	
6. Newfoundland and Labrador	162,750	
7. West Indies . . .	12,600	
8. { Central America . . .	8,600	
{ South America . . .	90,300	
	4,003,915	10,413,000
{ S. Georgia . . .	1,000	
{ Falkland Isles, &c. . .	6,500	
{ Fiji . . .	7,435	
{ Mauritius . . .	720	
{ Solomon Islands . . .	8,500	
9. { Gilbert " . . .	180	
{ Tonga " . . .	385	
{ St. Helena . . .	47	
{ Seychelles . . .	149	
{ Tristan Da Cunha, &c.. .	40	
{ Ascension . . .	38	
	24,994	754,000
{ Australia . . .	2,974,581	
10. { Papua . . .	90,540	
{ German New Guinea . .	90,000	
{ German Islands . . .	5,160	
11. { New Zealand . . .	103,860	
{ Samoa . . .	1,150	
	3,265,291	7,309,442
12. { Union of S. Africa . .	473,100	
{ German S.W. Africa . .	322,348	
13. { British E. Africa, &c. . .	509,000	
{ British W. Africa . . .	492,000	
14. { German Togoland } (?) . .	33,600	
{ " Cameroon } . . .	295,000	
15. South African Commission .	743,000	
16. Egypt . . .	400,000	
17. Soudan . . .	1,000,000	
	4,268,048	55,880,000
Total . . .	13,751,291	444,737,442

Cf. the Roman Empire at its widest. Estimated area 1,600,000 square miles : population 85,000,000.

## APPENDIX 2 A (continued). COMPARISON OF ROMAN AND BRITISH EMPIRES



APPENDIX 2A (continued). COMPARISON OF  
ROMAN AND BRITISH EMPIRES



From Lucas's "British Empire" by kind permission of Messrs Macmillan.

## APPENDIX 2 B. CONSTITUENTS OF THE EMPIRE

1. **United Kingdom** (including Man and the Channel Islands). Area, 121,390. Population, 46,550,000. External trade, £1,350,000,000.  
 L. Increasingly Democratic.  
 (1) Mainly Protestant.  
 A. 381—England, 669—Scotland, 156—Ireland, 137.  
 B. £29 4s. 0d.  
 W. £4 5s. 0d.  
 X. Compulsory.  
 Y. Voluntary.  
 Z. 73 per cent.
2. **Rest of Europe.** Area, 122. Population, 231,000. External trade, £4,500,000.  
 Malta, Oz—Gibraltar, Q.  
 Mediterranean Races.  
 C.  
 (1) Mainly Catholic.  
 A. 1,893—Gibraltar, 13,529.  
 B. £19.  
 X. Voluntary.  
 Y. Voluntary.
3. **Indian Empire.** Area, 1,900,000. Population, 315,000,000. External trade, £327,000,000.  
 Sub-Continent—Empire under British Sovereign and Parliament—population heterogeneous—constitution mainly feudal—some representation—Religions many, principally  
 (1), (2), (3), and (4).  
 M.  
 C. and D.  
 A. 166 — British India, 222 — Native States, 102.  
 B. £1 1s. 0d.  
 W. 7s. 0d.  
 X. Voluntary—very little diffused.  
 Y. Voluntary.  
 Z. 9·5.
4. **Rest of Asia.** Area, 167,531. Population, 8,600,000. External trade, £148,000,000.  
 Mainly Islands—Crown Colonies—Population various.  
 Cyprus, Oz.  
 Ceylon, Hong Kong, Straits Settlements, P.  
 Weihaiwei, R.  
 C. and E.  
 (1), (2), (3), and (4).  
 A. 51.  
 B. £17 5s. 0d.  
 X. Voluntary.  
 Y. Voluntary.
5. **Canada.** Area, 3,729,665. Population, 8,075,000. External trade, £227,000,000.  
 Continental — population mainly British.  
 C?, D?, and G.  
 N.  
 (1).  
 A. 2.  
 B. £28.  
 W. £9.  
 X. Compulsory.  
 Y. Compulsory.  
 Z. 44·5.

**6. Newfoundland and Labrador.**

Area, 162,750. Population, 243,000.  
 External trade, £6,200,000. Is-  
 land and Continental—popula-  
 tion mainly British.

C. and G.

N.

(1).

A. 1.5.

B. £25 10s. *od.*

W. £3 6s. *od.*

X. Voluntary.

Y. Voluntary.

Z. 20.

**7. West Indies.** Area, 12,600.

Population, 1,750,000. External  
 trade, £20,000,000.

Islands—population partly white,  
 partly coloured, largely negro.

C, D, and G.

Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, O1.

Jamaica, Leeward Islands, O2.

Grenada, St. Lucia, Trinidad, To-  
 bago, P.

(1).

A. 139.

B. £11 8s. *od.*

X. Voluntary.

Y. Voluntary.

**8. Rest of America.** Area, 98,900.

Population, 345,000. External  
 trade, £5,100,000.

Continental—population partly  
 white, partly coloured, partly  
 negro, largely aboriginal Indian  
 —some Asiatics.

C. and D.

British Guiana, O2.

„ Honduras, P.

(1), (2), (3), and (6).

A. 3.5.

B. £14 15s. *od.*

X. Voluntary.

Y. Voluntary.

Z. 17.5.

**9. Atlantic, Pacific, and Polyne-  
sian Islands.** Area, 24,994.

Population, 754,000. External  
 trade, £9,304,000.

Islands—races and religions various  
 —white population small.

C, D, and E.

Fiji and Mauritius, O2.

Falkland Islands and Seychelles, P.

A. 30.

B. £12 6s. 8*d.*

X. Voluntary.

Y. Voluntary.

**10. Australia.** Area, 2,974,581.

Population, 5,250,000. External  
 trade, £158,000,000.

Continent and Islands—population  
 mainly British—ultra-democratic  
 —female franchise.

G. New Guinea and Islands, D.

N.

(1).

A. 1.75.

B. £30.

W. £4 9s. *od.*

X. Compulsory.

Y. Compulsory.

Z. 56 per cent.—38.5 in the 6  
 capital cities.

(a) Papua. Area, 90,540. Popu-  
 lation, 280,000. External  
 trade, £376,000.


(b) German New Guinea. Area,  
 90,000. Population, 463,000.

(c) German Islands. Area, 5,160.  
 Population, 122,000. External  
 trade, £620,000.

- 11. New Zealand.** Area, 103,860.  
Population, 1,097,000. External trade, £45,000,000.  
Islands—population mainly British—about one-twelfth Maori.  
Ultrademocratic—female franchise.  
G. Samoa, D.  
N.  
(1).  
A. 10.
- 12. Union of South Africa.** Area, 473,100. Population, 6,000,000. External trade, £109,500,000.  
Continental—21 per cent. European—British and Dutch descent—Kaffirs and Indians—fairly democratic.  
C. and E.  
N.  
(1), (2), (3), and (6).
- 13. British East Africa, &c.** Area, 509,000. Population, 8,000,000. External trade, £7,660,000.  
Continental—mainly African—European population small—some Indians.  
C.
- 14. British West Africa.** Area, 492,000. Population, 20,000,000. External trade, £29,400,000.  
Continental—European population very small—Africans.  
C.  
Gambia, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Q.  
Ashanti, R.
- 15. South African High Commission.** Area, 743,000. Population, 2,260,000. External trade, £3,790,000.  
Continental—European population small—Kaffirs.  
Q.
- B. £41.  
W. £11.  
X. Compulsory.  
Y. Compulsory.  
Z. 51 per cent.—35 per cent. in 4 chief cities.  
(a) Maoris and Pacific Islands. Population, 62,442.  
(b) Samoa. Area, 1,150. Population, 35,000.
- A. 12-6.  
B. £18 5s. *od.*  
W. £2 10s. *od.*  
X. Partly compulsory.  
Y. Compulsory.  
Z. 14-2.  
(a) German South-West Africa. Area, 322,348. Population, 120,000.
- East Africa Protectorate, Q.  
Somaliland and Uganda, R.  
(1), (3), and (6).  
A. 16.  
B. £1.  
X. Voluntary—very little diffused.  
Y. Voluntary.
- (3) and (6).  
A. 4.  
B. £1 10s. *od.*  
X. Voluntary.  
Y. Voluntary.  
(a) German Togoland.<sup>1</sup> Area, 33,600. Population, 1,000,000.  
(b) Cameroon.<sup>1</sup> Area, 295,000. Population, 3,500,000.
- Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland, R.  
E.  
(1) and (6).  
A. 3.  
B. £1 13s. *od.*  
X. Voluntary.  
Y. Voluntary.

Taken from Germany by combined forces. Ownership not yet decided.









## APPENDIX 2 E

2



NOTE.—The United Kingdom produced only 1,500,000 tons; one-fifth of India's production.

# BARLEY, IMPORT 1915.



**U.S.A.**



**INDIA**




**CANADA**




**REST OF WORLD**

## APPENDIX 2 F

4


BRITISH IMPORT  
OF PEAS, 1912.

5

BRITISH IMPORT  
OF RICE, 1915.


## APPENDIX 2 E

6




## APPENDIX 2E

7




# CONSUMPTION OF TEA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 1916.




188  
MILLION  
LBS.

INDIAN




81  
MILLION  
LBS.

CEYLON



24  
MILLION  
LBS.

JAVA




9  
MILLION  
LBS.

CHINA

## APPENDIX 2 E


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NOTE.—The exigencies of space have not permitted of all the drawings being made to the same scale. Each drawing is of course correct in itself.


## APPENDIX 2F





# APPENDIX 2G: EMPIRE STATISTICS (I)


## GRAPHS SHOWING THE POPULATION OF NEW ZEALAND, 1854-1913.



**EXPLANATION OF THE GRAPHS.**—The base of each square represents an interval of one year, and the vertical height 10,000 persons. The upper curve shows the increase in the total population, the middle the increase in males, and the lower the increase in females.

## APPENDIX 2G: EMPIRE STATISTICS (2)

GRAPHS SHOWING THE VALUES OF IMPORTS, EXPORTS,  
AND TOTAL TRADE OF NEW ZEALAND, 1853-1913.



EXPLANATION OF GRAPHS.—The base of each small rectangle represents an interval of one year, and the vertical height one million pounds sterling. The total trade is shown in the upper thick curve, the lower curve shows the exports, and the thin curve the imports.

## APPENDIX 2G: EMPIRE STATISTICS (3)

In the table given below New Zealand's external trade per head of population is shown for each of the past ten years, the calculations being made exclusive as well as inclusive of specie for the purpose of arriving at exact conclusions as regards trade in goods.

Year.	Including Specie.						Excluding Specie.					
	Total Trade per Head of Mean Population (excluding Maoris).			Imports per Head of Mean Population (excluding Maoris).			Exports per Head of Mean Population (excluding Maoris).			Total Trade per Head of Mean Population (excluding Maoris).		
	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
1904	33	3	8	15	14	7	17	9	1	32	14	2
1905	32	14	10	14	14	11	17	19	11	32	6	6
1906	37	3	9	16	19	8	20	4	1	36	1	2
1907	40	13	3	18	16	6	21	16	9	39	16	6
1908	35	15	1	18	9	9	17	5	4	35	5	2
1909	36	7	3	16	2	7	20	4	8	35	9	1
1910	39	10	4	17	3	6	22	6	10	39	3	8
1911	38	0	2	19	5	2	18	15	0	37	4	2
1912	41	2	10	20	3	9	20	19	1	40	10	2
1913	42	7	3	20	17	1	21	10	2	41	12	2
										20	5	3
										21	6	11

The average trade per head in 1913 is the highest yet recorded. The year 1874, when the rate per head was £41 4s. 5d. (excluding specie) held the record until 1913, and is still in the lead as regards imports (£24 17s. per head).

## APPENDIX 3. METHODS OF GOVERNMENT.

**Europe.**

1. Russia.	Republic(?)	12. Greece	Limited Monarchy.
2. Switzerland	"	13. Italy.	" "
3. Portugal	"	14. Spain	" "
4. France	"	15. Holland	" "
5. San Marino	"	16. Belgium	" "
6. Andorra	"	17. Denmark	" "
7. Austria.	Limited Monarchy.	18. Sweden	" "
8. Bulgaria	" "	19. Norway	" "
9. Roumania	" "	20. Luxemburg	" "
10. Serbia	" "	21. Germany	Despotic "
11. Montenegro	" "	22. Turkey	" "
6 Republics. 14 Constitutional Monarchies. 2 Despotic Monarchies.			

**Asia.**

1. China.	Republic.	5. Afghanistan.	Despotic Monarchy
2. Japan.	Limited Monarchy.	6. Nepal	" "
3. Siam	" "	7. Oman	" "
4. Persia.	Despotic "	8. Bhutan	" "
1 Republic. 2 Constitutional Monarchies. 5 Despotic Monarchies.			

**America.**

1. United States.	Republic.	12. Venezuela.	Republic.
2. Mexico	"	13. Colombia	"
3. Bolivia	"	14. Ecuador	"
4. Salvador	"	15. Peru	"
5. Guatemala	"	16. Chile	"
6. Honduras	"	17. Paraguay	"
7. Nicaragua	"	18. Uruguay	"
8. Costa Rica	"	19. Brazil	"
9. Cuba	"	20. Argentine	"
10. Haiti	"	21. Panama	"
11. Santo Domingo	"		

21 Republics.


**Africa.**

1. Liberia.	Republic.	3. Morocco.	Despotic Monarchy.
2. Abyssinia.	Despotic Monarchy.		
1 Republic. 2 Despotic Monarchies (one of which is a French Protectorate).			

	<i>Monarchy.</i>			Total.
	<i>Republic.</i>	<i>Limited.</i>	<i>Despotic.</i>	
Europe	6	14	2	22
Asia	1	2	5	8
America	21	0	0	21
Africa	1	0	2	3
	<hr/> 29	<hr/> 16	<hr/> 9	<hr/> 54


## APPENDIX 4. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

EMPEROR OF INDIA—H.M. KING GEORGE V OF ENGLAND



NOTES.—(1) The Governor-General in Council is the direct Vicegerent of the Emperor, but is constitutionally responsible, through the Secretary of State, to Parliament.  
 (2) The Governors of Provinces have the right to correspond direct, on certain matters, with the Secretary of State.  
 (3) Chief Commissioners are under the direct authority of the Governor-General.  
 (4) Heavy lines in diagram indicate correspondence direct with Secretary of State.

## APPENDIX 4 A. THE GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON (TYPICAL CROWN COLONY)



## APPENDIX 4 B. RELIGIONS OF INDIA

Hindus <sup>1</sup>	.	.	218,000,000	69.0	per cent.
Muhammadans	.	.	67,000,000	21.0	"
Buddhists	.	.	11,000,000	3.5	"
Animists	.	.	10,000,000	3.0	"
Christians	.	.	3,900,000	1.2	"
Sikhs	.	.	3,000,000	.9	"
Jains	.	.	1,250,000	.4	"
Parsis	.	.	100,000	.03	"


<sup>1</sup> This is not really accurate. Under *Hindu* are probably included many who are not strictly Hindus, and who, like the members of the Dravidian Mahajan Sabha of Madras, or the Namasudra Community of Eastern Bengal, declare that : 'There has been existing for centuries enmity and hatred between their community and that of the Hindus. The Hindus have been persecuting them in a thousand-and-one ways.' These words may or may not be the expression of historical fact, but they certainly are of deep-rooted feeling.

## APPENDIX 4 c. PRINCIPAL LANGUAGES OF INDIA


1. Hindi	.	.	82,000,000	26.0	per cent.
2. Bengali	.	.	48,000,000	15.2	"
3. Telugu	.	.	24,000,000	7.6	"
4. Marathi	.	.	20,000,000	6.3	"
5. Tamil	.	.	18,000,000	5.7	"
6. Punjabi	.	.	16,000,000	5.1	"
7. Burmese, &c.	.	.	11,000,000	3.5	"
✓ 8. English	.	.	1,000,000	.3	"

1, 2, and 4 have scripts of the *Devanagari* type. 3 and 5 are *Dravidian*. 7 is *Mongolian*, but has no tones, as have Chinese and Siamese. It has an alphabet. 8 is used by the British and domiciled communities, and also by the *literates* in addition to their own vernaculars.

## APPENDIX 4D



## APPENDIX 4 E





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